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SUMMARY

This thesis is about theories of the indicative conditional and apparent
counterexamples to classically valid argument forms. Specifically, it applies the
following four theories:
-

material (inspired by Grice (1961, 1975 and 1989));

-

possible-worlds (inspired by Stalnaker (1981); Lewis (1976); and
Kratzer (2012)),

-

suppositional (inspired by Adams (1975) and Edgington (1995 and
2014)); and

-

hybrid (inspired by Jackson (1987))

to try and solve the following two counterexamples:
-

Vann McGee’s to modus ponens (1985); and

-

Lewis Carroll’s to modus tollens (1894).

I argue that none of the theories I consider can explain – without facing any
problems – the individually plausible but jointly inconsistent theses that give
rise to the apparent counterexamples. A theory can explain a thesis when it can
account for why a naïve speaker might have the relevant intuition. In the case
of McGee’s Election Paradox, the theses are the following:
-

McGee’s argument is invalid;

-

McGee’s argument is an instance of modus ponens; and

-

modus ponens is valid.

Similarly, in the case of Carroll’s Barbershop Paradox, the theses are the
following:
-

Carroll’s argument is invalid;
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-

Carroll’s argument is an instance of modus tollens; and

-

modus tollens is valid.

Despite consensus that the orthodox theories, those I examine, provide answers
to questions about conditionals, the paradoxes (even some after over a century)
persist: arguments we take obviously to be valid appear to have instances in
which they aren’t.
The thesis proceeds in four parts. In Chapter 1, I present the four theories
and justify why they rather than others deserve our attention. Along the way, I
disagree with Adams (1975). While he claims that on the suppositional theory,
we can’t evaluate an indicative conditional whose consequent is a conditional,
I include a proof that enables us to.
In Chapter 2, I consider McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens and
how the theories might explain the theses of the relevant trilemma. I refute
extant solutions: while the Dartmouth group (1986) thinks the material theory
can solve the paradox and Edgington thinks the suppositional one can solve it
and Jackson thinks the hybrid one can, I show that their solutions fall short of
being comprehensive.
In Chapter 3, I do the same, this time considering Carroll’s
counterexample to modus tollens. I show that the paradox remains without a
solution – and this despite the progress logicians made on conditionals in the
centuries following the paradox’s publication and the attempts logicians made
at offering a solution.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine how premise semantics (Kratzer, 2012),
a version of the possible-worlds theory, might explain McGee’s and Carroll’s
counterexamples along with some others, these featuring not embedded
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conditionals but embedded modals. I argue that, when it comes to
counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens with (overt) modal verbs
and adverbs, the theory gives us some results we want (e.g. invalidating
Kolodny and MacFarlane’s Miners examples (2010)) and others we don’t (e.g.
validating Cantwell’s Lottery (2008)) – a point which the literature previously
overlooked.
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INTRODUCTION

If you’re reading this, then you’re alive.
You’re reading this.
Therefore, you’re alive.
and
If you’re Theresa Helke, then you wrote this example.
You didn’t write this example.
Therefore, you aren’t Theresa Helke.
are instances of modus ponens and modus tollens respectively. The arguments,
variations perhaps on the cogito ergo sum, have the following forms:
If A, then B.
A.
Therefore, B.
in the case of the modus ponens and
If C, then D.
Not-D.
Therefore, not-C.
in the case of the modus tollens.
The first premise in each is a conditional. Here, in our modus ponens,
it’s ‘If A, then B’; and in our modus tollens, ‘If C, then D’. The second
premise and conclusion in each do different things. In a modus ponens, the
second premise confirms the antecedent of the first, here A, and the conclusion
confirms the consequent of the first, here B. In a modus tollens, on the other
hand, the second premise contradicts the consequent of the first, here D (i.e.
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confirms ‘not-D’) and the conclusion contradicts the antecedent of the first
premise, here C (i.e. confirms ‘not-C’).
You might think the two argument forms are valid. When both the
premises are true, so too must be the conclusion, i.e. when it’s true both that if
you’re reading this, then you’re alive and you’re reading this, then it must be
true that you’re alive; likewise, when it’s true both that if you’re Theresa
Helke, then you wrote the example but you didn’t write the example, then it
must be true that you aren’t Theresa Helke.
Certainly, an introduction to Logic textbook would agree that modus
ponens and modus tollens are valid. This thesis is about how they might not
be: how arguments can have the forms we saw above and premises we’d
accept but a conclusion we’d reject. (Maybe you aren’t alive after all! Maybe
you’re me!) Indeed, the research project focuses on theories of the indicative
conditional and apparent counterexamples to classically valid argument forms.
Specifically, it applies the material (inspired by Grice (1961, 1975 and
1989)), possible-worlds (inspired by Stalnaker (1981); Lewis (1976); and
Kratzer (2012)), suppositional (inspired by Adams (1975) and Edgington
(1995 and 2014)) and hybrid (inspired by Jackson (1987)) theories to try and
solve Vann McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens (1985) and Lewis
Carroll’s to modus tollens (1894).
Throughout, I understand an indicative conditional to be like the first –
and not the second – of the Adams pair below:
(i) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did.
(ii) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, then someone else would have
(from Khoo (2015, p. 1) who draws on Adams (1970)).
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I agree with Justin Khoo (2015) that ‘(i) is about how the world was, given
what we now know plus the supposition of the antecedent; (ii) is about how
the world would have been (now that we know about it) were its antecedent to
have held (pp. 1-2, emphasis in original).
There are both syntactic and semantic differences between (i) and (ii),
which I understand to be a subjunctive conditional. The syntactic difference
lies in the ‘extra layer of past tense’ (which in English we mark
morphologically with the past perfect ‘had’) which (ii) carries and the
presence in the consequent of (ii) of the modal auxiliary verb ‘would’ (Khoo,
2015, p. 1).
The semantic difference between (i) and (ii), on the other hand, lies in
their truth conditions. Indeed, (i) is true while (ii) is false. We know that
someone shot Kennedy and that there was no backup shooter (assuming we’re
Warrenites) (Khoo, 2015, p. 1).
If I’m focusing on indicative rather than subjunctive conditionals, it’s
because the conditionals in the apparent counterexamples to modus ponens
and modus tollens – the paradoxes – I want to analyse are not subjunctive but
indicative.1
My argument is that none of the theories I consider can explain
successfully the individually plausible but jointly inconsistent theses that give
rise to the apparent counterexamples. Despite consensus that the orthodox
theories, those I examine, provide answers to questions about conditionals, the

1

Note that beyond limiting the entire thesis to indicative conditionals, I limit
much of it to indicative conditionals where neither the antecedent nor the
consequent contains any (overt) modal. Indeed, it’s only in Chapter 4 that I
consider conditionals whose consequent contains an overt modal.
3

paradoxes (even some after over a century) persist: arguments we take
obviously to be valid appear to have instances in which they aren’t.
In Chapter 1, I present the four theories and justify why they rather
than others deserve our attention. In Chapter 2, I consider McGee’s
counterexample to modus ponens (the ‘Election Paradox’) and how the
theories might explain the theses of the relevant trilemma. In Chapter 3, I do
the same, this time considering Carroll’s counterexample to modus tollens (the
‘Barbershop Paradox’). And in Chapter 4, I examine how premise semantics,
(Kratzer, 2012), might explain McGee and Carroll’s counterexamples along
with some others.2

2

Note that throughout, I’ll be evaluating the purported counterexamples as
though a single speaker were uttering or considering the propositions. The
results might be different if one evaluated each argument as – not a soliloquy
but – a dialogue between two speakers. Thanks to mitcho Erlewine for
pointing this out.
4

CHAPTER 1
THE FOUR THEORIES

Consider the following two propositions:
The Equivalence Thesis: The indicative conditional is the material
conditional; and
Adams’ Thesis: The assertibility of ‘If Q, then R’ is equal to the
conditional probability of R given Q.
For the time being, we understand assertibility of a sentence as the extent to
which we are justified in asserting that sentence. We’ll return to this concept
in due course. Now, when it comes to accepting or rejecting these two
propositions, there are four possibilities:
(i) Accept the Equivalence Thesis but reject Adams’ Thesis;
(ii) Reject both the Equivalence Thesis and Adams’ Thesis;
(iii) Reject the Equivalence Thesis but accept Adams’ Thesis; and
(iv) Accept both the Equivalence Thesis and Adams’ Thesis.
In this chapter, I consider in turn the four possibilities, each corresponding
with a theory of the indicative conditional: (i) the material; (ii) the possibleworlds; (iii) the suppositional; and (iv) the hybrid theory. In sections 1 through
4, I’ll outline their main tenets and note some merits and demerits – building a
foundation for the chapters to come. In section 5, I conclude.
If these theories deserve our attention here, it’s because they appear to
be good candidates for solving the Election and Barbershop paradoxes we’ll
see later. The paradoxes challenge classical logic and the theories were built to
explain a challenge to classical logic, i.e. that there appears to be some
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difference between the material conditional we use to derive proofs and the
indicative one we use in everyday speech. Of course, there are other theories:
Cantwell (2008), Yalcin (2012), Bledin (2015) to mention only three. If I
don’t consider them here it’s not because they don’t deserve our attention.
Rather, it’s because considering them lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

1. The material theory
According to the material theorist, the Equivalence Thesis or the ‘horseshoe
analysis’ holds: the indicative conditional (which I’ll represent as the arrow
®) is the material conditional (which I’ll represent as the hook É ; an
indicative conditional Q ® R is true if and only if the corresponding material
conditional Q É R is true. In other words, ‘If Q, then R’ is true if and only if Q
is false or R is true. For example, let Q be ‘Ben’s on sabbatical’ and R be ‘he’s
in Australia’. The indicative conditional ‘If Ben’s on sabbatical, then he’s in
Australia’ is true if and only if it’s not the case that Ben’s on sabbatical or it’s
the case that he’s in Australia.
So, according to the material theorist, we can represent the truth
conditions in the following truth table:

Q

R

Q®R

True

True

True

True

False

False

False

True

True

False

False

True
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Table 1: Truth conditions of the indicative conditional according to the
material theorist
Looking at the table, one might think the truth conditions absurd: How can a
conditional be true, say, when it has a false antecedent and true consequent?
Or when both the antecedent and consequent are false? One way of making
sense of the table is through the following story. Imagine one day I promise
you ‘If you bring me durian, then I’ll pay you SGD 30’. The following day,
when you bring me durian and I pay you SGD 30, I honoured the promise.
When I said ‘If you bring me durian, I’ll pay you SGD 30’, I spoke the truth.
This accounts for the true-true case. When you don’t bring me any fruit and I
don’t pay you any money, I didn’t fail to honour the promise. In asserting the
conditional, I spoke the truth. This accounts for the false-false case. Likewise,
when you don’t bring me any fruit but (out of magnanimity?) I decide to give
you SGD 30, I didn’t fail to honour the promise. In asserting the conditional, I
spoke the truth. This accounts for the false-true case. But when you bring me
durian and I don’t pay you any money, then I fail to honour the promise. This
accounts for the true-false case.
So yes, according to the material theory, an indicative conditional is
true if and only if it’s not the case that the antecedent is true and the
consequent is false. In other words, an indicative conditional is true if and only
if Q is false or R is true.
This point is important in our discussion in Chapters 2 through 4 of
modus ponens and modus tollens. The validity of both argument forms relies
on a conditional being false where it has a true antecedent and false
consequent.
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Next, according to the material theorist, it’s not the case that Adams’
Thesis holds. The material theorist concerns herself with the truth of the
antecedent and consequent, rather than the conditional probability of the one
given the other. Now, there are two kinds of material theorists. On the one
hand, there’s the earlier theorist. According to her, assertability goes with
truth: a conditional is assertable if and only if it’s true (Russell, 1905). On the
other hand, there’s the later theorist. According to her, assertability doesn’t go
with truth.
Logicians developed the later theory in light of objections to the earlier
one. The earlier theory faced problems not when it came to conditionals such
as the following two:
True-true If 2 is divisible by 2, then 2 is an even number; and
True-false If 2 is divisible by 2, then 2 is an odd number.
Consistent with the theory, we might be prepared to assert the first which, with
a true antecedent and consequent, is true. Likewise consistent with the theory,
we wouldn’t be prepared to assert the second which, with a true antecedent
and false consequent, is false.
No, the earlier theory faced problems when it came to conditionals
such as the following two:
False-true If Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore, then
Angela Merkel is the Chancellor of Germany.
False-false If Vienna is the capital of England, then Vienna is the
capital of Switzerland.
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Both conditionals are true, according to the earlier (and later) theorist on the
grounds that both have a false antecedent. Nonetheless, contra the earlier
theorist, we mightn’t be prepared to assert either. We would sound absurd!
Considering these objections, later theorists hold that it’s not the case
that the truth of a conditional is necessary and sufficient for our being
prepared to assert it. Indeed, we mightn’t be prepared to assert some truth
conditionals such as False-true or False-false. Rather, and central to the later
theory, we’re prepared to assert an indicative conditional when, doing so,
we’d be abiding by the Cooperative Principle.
Before we turn to the principle, note that henceforth when I write
‘material theorist’, I’m referring to the later kind.

1.1. The Cooperative Principle
According to the Cooperative Principle, you must ‘Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged’
(Grice, 1975, p. 45).
For example, suppose that you approach me in the street and ask me
‘Where is the wet market?’ To abide by the Cooperative Principle, I could
respond: ‘It is at the end of the street on the right’, assuming that the market is
indeed at the end of the street on the right. Here, I would be making a
contribution such as is required (an answer); I would be doing so at the stage
at which it occurs (right after you ask a question); by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which we are engaged (addressing your
specific question). Not to abide by the Cooperative Principle, I could respond
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instead: ‘You could go down the street and turn left’. Here I might be
contributing an answer right after you ask a question. However, I wouldn’t be
responding to your specific question. Rather, I’d be responding to the
question: ‘Where could I go?’
The material theorist is at pains to define the Cooperative Principle
because of the existence of conversational implicature. False-true and Falsefalse aside, when speaking, I might make a true statement while implicating a
false one. For example, I could say ‘The banana seems yellow’. Assuming that
the banana indeed seems yellow, I am speaking the truth. However, by using
the verb ‘to seem’ rather than ‘to be’ (‘The banana seems yellow’ rather than
‘The banana is yellow’), I am suggesting that the banana mightn’t actually be
yellow. I’m suggesting that the fruit might instead be a different colour.
When it comes to indicative conditionals, assuming that they’re
identical to material ones, it’s easy to make true statements while implicating
false ones. For example, I could say ‘If the market is not on the left, then it is
on the right’. According to the truth table of the material conditional, this
statement is true. It has a true consequent. However, truth table aside, I’m
implicating a false one. I’m suggesting that the market might be on the left
when I know that it is on the right.
Likewise, given a certain scenario, ‘You won’t eat those and live’
(Lewis, 1976, p. 306) is an example of a true but not assertable sentence.
Imagine I utter the sentence while pointing at some non-toxic mushrooms and
you, deferring to my apparent mycological knowledge, refrain from eating the
mushrooms. I told no lie. Formally, the sentence is true. The sentence is a
negated conjunction and one of the conjuncts is false (‘you eat those’). Indeed,
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it’s not the case that you eat the mushrooms. Nonetheless, the original
sentence isn’t assertable. It wouldn’t be a cooperative thing to say.

1.1.1. Maxims
Now, within the Cooperative Principle, there are four categories of maxims by
which we abide: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner. For the purposes of
this dissertation, the following two maxims, one falling under the category of
Quality and the other of Manner, are the most relevant:
(i) Don’t assert what you don’t believe (Grice, 1975, p. 46); and
(ii) Assert the stronger rather than the weaker (Jackson, 1979, p. 566).
Let’s look at each in turn.

(i) Don’t assert what you don’t believe
Grice’s words are ‘Do not say what you believe to be false’ but I think the
stronger maxim ‘Don’t assert what you don’t believe’ is desirable. Grice’s
maxim allows that, so long as we don’t believe a sentence to be false, we may
assert it. This means that according to the maxim, if I don’t believe my mother
is in Geneva but I don’t believe my mother’s not in Geneva (maybe she
changed her plans and is in Geneva?), I could still assert ‘My mother is in
Geneva’. According to the stronger maxim, however, we couldn’t assert ‘My
mother is in Geneva’. We’d be asserting something we don’t believe.

(ii) Assert the stronger rather than the weaker
A sentence Q is logically stronger than another R, where Q entails R but not
vice versa. For example, let Q be S and R be S Ú ¬ S. Here, S entails S Ú ¬ S
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but not vice versa. Suppose that S is ‘x is divisible by 2’. From this, it follows
that ‘x is divisible by 2 or it is not divisible by 2’. However, from ‘x is
divisible by 2 or it is not divisible by 2’, it does not follow that ‘x is divisible
by 2’. x could be an odd number. According to (ii), we ought to assert S rather
than S Ú ¬ S. S is logically stronger than S Ú ¬ S.
Of course, there are many possible reasons for wanting to assert R
rather than Q. For example, Q might not be true or believable. ‘Hui Li is
teaching’ might not be true while ‘Hui Li is teaching or Hui Li isn’t teaching’
is. Another reason for wanting to assert the weaker R rather than the stronger
Q is that Q might be ‘unduly blunt’ (Jackson, 1979, p. 566). ‘I may or may not
fail you’ is less unequivocal than ‘I will fail you’ and we might want to
cultivate hope in our student. But abandoning the context of grading and
focusing on epistemic and semantic considerations, there is, according to
Jackson, no reason not to assert Q: ‘There is no significant loss of probability
in asserting [Q] and, by the transitivity of entailment, [Q] must yield
everything and more than [R] does. Therefore, [Q] is to be asserted rather than
[R], ceteris paribus’ (Jackson, 1979, p. 566).

1.2. Returning to False-true and False-false
The material theorist uses the idea of logically weak and strong statements to
explain away counterexamples such as False-true and False-false. When it
comes to conditionals A É B where one of ¬ A or B is highly probable, the
material theorist says that you should come right out and assert the logically
stronger statement, namely ‘¬ A’ or ‘B’ as the case may be (Jackson, 1979,
pp. 566-7).
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For example, we should assert not False-true but only its consequent.
We believe False-true inasmuch as we believe that the consequent is true. The
statement ‘Angela Merkel is the Chancellor of Germany’ is logically stronger
than ‘If Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore, then she is the
Chancellor of Germany’. ‘She is the Chancellor of Germany’ entails ‘If
Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore, then she is the Chancellor
of Germany’ but not vice versa. Granted, the conditional is true where the
antecedent is false and the consequent true. On the equivalence thesis,
however, we should assert only the true consequent.
Likewise, we should assert not False-false but only the negation of its
antecedent. We believe False-false inasmuch as we believe that the antecedent
is false. The statement ‘It’s not the case that Vienna is the capital of England’
is logically stronger than ‘If Vienna is the capital of England, then Vienna is
the capital of Switzerland’. ‘It’s not the case that Vienna is the capital of
England’ entails ‘If Vienna is the capital of England, then Vienna is the capital
of Switzerland’ but not vice versa. The conditional is true where both the
antecedent and consequent are false. On the equivalence thesis, however, we
should assert only the negation of the antecedent.
Another way of dismissing False-true and False-false is by saying that
we wouldn’t assert them because they are purposefully deceptive or confusing.
False-true suggests that Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore.
False-false suggests that Vienna is the capital of England and Switzerland.
As we’ll see in the Chapters 2 through 4, this theory faces challenges.
Moving forward, we might reject the Equivalence Thesis. Accepting it
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required a principle to explain why we mightn’t assert true conditionals. The
possible-worlds theorist rejects the Equivalence Thesis. Let’s turn to it next.

2. The possible-worlds theory
Like the material theorist and on the same grounds, the possible-worlds one
rejects Adams’ Thesis. She concerns herself with the truth of the antecedent
and consequent, rather than the conditional probability of the one given the
other. Unlike the material one, however, the possible-worlds theorist
furthermore rejects the Equivalence Thesis.
According to the possible-worlds theorist, an indicative conditional ‘If
Q, then R’ is true in a possible world w if and only if R is true in all the Qworlds which are most similar to w (and vacuously true when there’s no Qworld), where Q-world is one in which the antecedent Q is true (Stalnaker,
1981, pp. 46-7; see also Lewis, 1973, though as the title suggests and unlike us
here, Lewis is talking about counterfactual rather than indicative conditionals).
For example, the conditional ‘If Nicholas is at the office, then he’s in London’
is true in the actual world just in case Nicholas is in London in all most-similar
worlds in which Nicholas is at the office.
And according to the possible-worlds theorist, it’s not the case that
we’re prepared to assert an indicative conditional when there’s a high
probability in the consequent given the antecedent. Rather, we’re prepared to
assert a conditional if and only if it’s true in every antecedent-world mostsimilar to the actual world.3

3

This isn’t to say the possible-worlds theorist rejects the Equivalence Thesis
so much as to say it’s not applicable. The theorist doesn’t use the Thesis to
explain a difference between the material and indicative conditionals.
14

Now, possible-worlds theorists disagree on the number of most-similar
antecedent-worlds to any given possible world. Some such as Stalnaker (1981)
hold that there can be only one (p. 46). Let’s call them the single-world
theorists. Others such as Lewis (1973) hold that there can be more than one
(pp. 97-8). Let’s call them the multiple-world theorists and look at each in
turn, considering their merits and demerits. (As Lewis’s theory is about
counterfactual conditionals and here we are looking at indicative ones, the
multiple-world theorist is an imagined version of Lewis.)

2.1. Single-world theory
Predictably perhaps, the single-world theorist does a good job accounting for
conditionals where there’s a single most-similar antecedent-world. Consider
the truth of the conditional A ® B where, say, A is ‘the train arrives late at
5:07pm’ and B is ‘I will miss the connecting 5:03pm train’ and suppose that
the train is due to arrive at 5:00pm. This conditional is true. We look at the
most-similar A-worlds, those where it’s true that the train arrives at 5:07pm.
And in v, the A-world closest to w, the consequent is true. In v, everything is
exactly the same as in w with the exception that the train arrives seven minutes
late. The connecting train leaves on time at 5:03pm and I miss it. With a true
antecedent and a true consequent in the antecedent-world closest to the actual
one, the conditional is true.
Of course, there are other worlds in which the train arrives late, at
5:07pm, but I don’t miss the connecting train. For example, in u, the
connecting train might leave late, at 5:15pm, allowing me eight minutes to
alight from the one train and board the other. In this world, the conditional is
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false. It has a true antecedent but a false consequent. However, it doesn’t make
the conditional false in the actual world. u is not as close to w as v and we are
concerned with the truth value of the conditional in the A-world closest to w. u
is different not only in that the first train arrives seven minutes late but also in
that the second train leaves 12 minutes late. Thus we need not worry about the
truth value of the conditional in u, only in v.
The single-world theorist does less good a job accounting for
conditionals where there’s no most-similar antecedent-world. Such a scenario
could arise for a couple of reasons: first, it may be that given any antecedentworld, there’s another, more similar to the actual world; and second, it may be
that two or more worlds are equally similar to the actual world and more
similar to it than any other worlds (Lewis, 1973, p. 80).
Here are a couple of examples where there’s no most-similar
antecedent-world for each of those reasons.
(i) Taller (inspired by Edgington, 1995, p. 252)
If I’m taller than 2.5m, then I must pay to ride the bus.
In the case of the conditional above, for any given antecedent-world, there’s
another, more similar one. The more my height tends (from above) toward
2.5m in a possible world, the more similar that world is to the actual world,
where I’m shorter than 2.5m. However, there’ll be no most-similar world. For
every antecedent-world where I am 2.55m tall, there’s another, more similar
world where I’m 2.525m tall. And for every antecedent-world where I’m
2.525m tall, there’s another, even more similar one where I’m 2.5125m tall,
etc. Without a most-similar possible world, the theory can’t determine the
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truth value of the conditional and without a truth value, the theory can’t
determine whether we’d be prepared to assert the conditional.
(Of course, short of being able to determine the truth value, we might
think this is a case where the conditional is vacuously true (no Q-world?) – but
that isn’t desirable either. As Edgington points out, it would follow that ‘If
were taller than I am, no one would know the difference’ would come out as
true (1995, p. 252). While this isn’t an indicative conditional, it’s relevant
nonetheless as one with potentially no most-similar antecedent world.)
(ii) Les compatriotes and I compatrioti
If François and Italo are compatriots, then they’re both French; and
If François and Italo are compatriots, then they’re both Italian.4
In the case of each conditional in the pair above, there are two most-similar
antecedent-worlds: the world in which Italo is French and the world in which
François is Italian; and in all respects except the nationality of the relevant
man, the two worlds are exactly the same as the actual world. With no single
most-similar antecedent-world, the single-world theorist can’t determine the
truth value of the conditional and, thereby, can’t determine whether we’d be
prepared to assert it.
That said, the single-world theorist would take the disjunction of the
two (i.e. where Les compatriotes and I compatrioti each form a disjunct) to be
true. Indeed and unlike the multiple-world one, the single-world theorist can
derive the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, according to which (Q
® R) Ú (Q ® ¬ R) is a tautology. This will prove valuable in explaining a

4

See Quine, 1952, p. 15 for the original pair of counterexamples with Bizet
and Verdi; or Lewis, 1973, p. 80 for more recent a discussion.
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thesis (#2) in Chapter 3 (subsection 2.2.). We’ll save her proof of the principle
until then.

2.2. The multiple-world theory
In contrast but still predictably perhaps, the multiple-world theorist does a
good job accounting for the two cases above. According to her, both
conditionals come out as false because for each there are two most-similar
antecedent-worlds each assigning a different truth value to the consequent –
and the theory considers such conditionals false. That said, the multiple-world
theorist doesn’t systematically do better than the single-world one as we’ll see
in Chapters 2 and 3. Indeed, her rejection of the principle of Conditional
Excluded Middle prevents the multiple-world theorist from explaining a thesis
(#2) which the single-world one can in Chapter 3.
Finally and briefly, there’s a third kind of possible-worlds theorist:
we’ll call her the premise semanticist. I’ll wait until Chapter 4 to give a full
exegesis. The theory offers an account of statements with embedded modals
and in that chapter we’ll consider some.

3. The suppositional theory
The suppositional theorist rejects the Equivalence Thesis but accepts Adams’
Thesis. According to her, conditionals are things we evaluate in terms of
probabilities (Adams (1975) and Edgington (1995 and 2014)). Indeed,
according to her, we’re prepared to assert an indicative conditional Q ® R
when there’s a high conditional probability of the consequent R, on the
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supposition that the antecedent Q is true (so long as the probability of Q isn’t
equal to zero) – and the Equation holds true.

3.1. The Equation
According to the Equation, the probability of an indicative conditional Q ® R
is equal to the conditional probability of the consequent R, on the supposition
that the antecedent Q is true so long as the probability of Q isn’t equal to zero.
Formally, writing ‘P’ for probability and ‘|’ for given, we get the following:
P(Q ® R) = P(R | Q) provided that P(Q) ≠ 0.
So, according to the Equation, the probability of the conditional ‘If Josie’s at
home, then she’s in New York’ is equal to the conditional probability of
‘Josie’s in New York’ given ‘she’s at home’.
Two things to note at this point:
(i) logicians disagree on the range of Q and R in the Equation. Some take Q
and R to range over only propositions. Adams (1975) and McGee (1989) are
cases in point. Others take Q and R to range over propositions and nonpropositions (i.e. sentences which don’t necessarily have a truth value).
(McGee allows right- but not left-nested conditionals (Hájek, 2012, pp. 150-1)
and I’ll side with him.) This disagreement is an important matter, as we’ll see
when deriving the Triviality Result below and when defining modus ponens
and modus tollens in Chapters 2 and 3; and
(ii) the Equation is different from Adams’ Thesis: while the Equation equates
probability of a conditional with conditional probability, Adams’ Thesis
equates assertibility with conditional probability. In Chapter 2 (subsection
4.1), we’ll see the difference prevent the hybrid theorist from adopting as it is
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a proof by the suppositional theorist. The proof relies on the Equation which,
unlike the suppositional one, the hybrid theorist doesn’t accept. Indeed, the
difference will require the hybrid theorist to adapt the proof.
Now, to calculate the conditional probability of the consequent, given
the antecedent, we rely on the Ratio Formula.

3.2. The Ratio Formula
According to the Ratio Formula, for any proposition Q and R, the conditional
probability of R given Q equals the probability of the conjunction of Q and R
divided by the probability of Q so long as the probability of Q isn’t equal to
zero (Hájek 273). Formally, we get
P(R | Q) = P(Q Ù R) / P(Q) provided that P(Q) ≠ 0.
So, the conditional probability of ‘Josie’s in New York’ given ‘she’s at home’
is equal to the probability of ‘Josie’s at home and she’s in New York’ divided
by the probability of ‘Josie’s in New York’.

3.3. Returning to False-true & co and evaluating the theory
The suppositional theorist can account for the conditionals we’ve been
considering. According to her, we aren’t prepared to assert False-true because,
assuming that Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore, there won’t
be a high probability that she’s the Chancellor of Germany. Among the facts
of the world is the following one: Singapore and Germany are two different
countries and no person is simultaneously the head of state in both.
We aren’t prepared to assert False-false because assuming that Vienna
is the capital of England, there won’t be a high probability that Vienna is the

20

capital of Switzerland. Also among the facts of the world is the following one:
England and Switzerland are two countries and no city is simultaneously the
capital of both.
The suppositional theory can account for Taller the same way in which
it accounts for other conditionals. We’d evaluate the consequent of Taller on
the supposition of the antecedent.
Finally, consistent with our intuition, we wouldn’t be prepared to
assert Les compatriotes or I compatrioti. Assuming François and Italo are
compatriots, there wouldn’t be a high probability that they were both French,
or in the other case, that they were both Italian.
The suppositional theorist does a good job explaining why we would
or wouldn’t assert or could evaluate False-true and the other conditionals
we’ve considered so far. However, the theory makes a serious departure from
the notions of truth and validity of classical logic – which some might view as
a demerit – and without that departure, the Triviality Result follows (Lewis,
1976).

3.4. The Triviality Result
The Equation in part implies that a conditional is non-propositional. Indeed,
the Equation plus the assumption that a conditional is propositional would lead
to absurdity: they imply that no change in any proposition’s probability affects
another’s. For example, an increase in the probability that Roger Federer will
win the Wimbledon final against Rafael Nadal (say, Roger’s serving match
point, leading six games to four in the third set and two sets to zero) doesn’t
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affect the original probability that Rafael will win. Logicians call such a
scenario, where no change affects any change, trivial.
Specifically, the scenario arises from the fact that conditionals could
embed everywhere and the probability of any conditional would be the
probability of its consequent. For any sentence ‘Roger will win’, we could
create a conditional ‘If x, then Roger will win’ and no matter what we choose
for x, the probability of the conditional will be that of the consequent ‘Roger
will win’. x could be ‘Roger will lose’ and that wouldn’t affect the probability
of the conditional. Absurdly, it would remain that of ‘Roger will win’.
Now, to derive the Triviality Result, apart from relying on the Ratio
Formula, the Equation and Conditionalisation (which we’ll define), we rely on
the following axioms and theorems:

Axioms
A1. P(A) ³ 0
A2. If T is a tautology, then P(T) = 1
A3. P(A Ú B) = P(A) + P(B) if A and B are inconsistent
Theorems
T1. If C is a contradiction, then P(C) = 0
T2. P(A) = P(B) if A and B are equivalent
T3. P(A Ù B) = P(A | B) ´ P(B) provided that P(B) ≠ 0

We begin by proving a lemma – which will serve us not only in this proof but
later.
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3.4.1. Import-Export
We call Import-Export the rule of inference according to which we can derive
Q ® (R ® S) from (Q Ù R) ® S and vice versa. We’ll also call Import-Export
the probabilistic equivalence between the probabilities of those two sentences:
P(Q ® (R ® S) = P((Q Ù R) ® S). Before we derive this equivalence, we note
that Import-Export will prove important in this thesis.
In Chapter 2, for example, the possible-worlds theorist will appeal to
her rejection of Import-Export to reject in turn the proposition according to
which McGee’s argument is an instance of modus ponens. While McGee
formalises the first premise as having the form Q ® (R ® S), the possibleworlds theorist would formalise it as having the form (Q Ù R) ® S and, citing
the invalidity of Import-Export according to her theory (i.e. rejecting that one
can derive the one relevant conditional from the other), she would deny that
McGee’s argument is counterexample to modus ponens.
Also in that chapter, as in Chapter 3, the suppositional theorist will
appeal to her acceptance of Import-Export to calculate the probability of the
first premise in McGee and Carroll’s respective arguments. Contra Adams
(1975, pp. 30-3), I show that she can evaluate the probability of a conditional
with a conditional as consequent: by evaluating the probability of the
equivalent conditional with a conjunction as antecedent.
McGee notes that his argument suggests it’s not the case modus ponens
and Import-Export can both be valid where the conditional connective is
stronger than É, as we’d expect ® to be (McGee, 1985, pp. 465-6). While we
find both valid where the connective is the material conditional, ‘[w]e have
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explicit examples to show that the indicative conditional does not satisfy
modus ponens’, McGee writes (1985, p. 466). I’ll dedicate Chapter 2 to
examining one of the examples he offers.
Here, first, to prove the probabilistic equivalence of Q ® (R ® S) and
(Q Ù R) ® S, we rely on not only the Equation but also Conditionalisation.

3.4.1.1. Conditionalisation
According to Conditionalisation, for any formulae Q and R, the probability of
R after we find out that Q is equal to the conditional probability of R given Q.
Formally, we get the following equation, where PQ(R) is the posterior
probability of R after we discover Q (Lewis, 1976, p. p. 299):
PQ(R) = P(R | Q)
So, according to Conditionalisation, the probability of ‘Josie’s in New York’
after we find out that ‘she’s at home’ is the conditional probability of ‘she’s in
New York’ given ‘Josie’s at home’.
Now, assuming P(Q Ù R) ≠ 0 and using the Equation and
Conditionalisation, we can prove that Q ® (R ® S) and (Q Ù R) ® S are
probabilistically equivalent (see Alan Hájek’s proof in Bennett, 2003, p. 62):
1. P(Q ® (R ® S)) = P((R ® S) | Q) by the Equation
2. = PQ(R ® S)

from 1 by Conditionalisation

3. = PQ(S | R)

from 2 by the Equation

4. = PQ(S Ù R) ÷ PQ(R)

from 3 by the Ratio Formula

5. = P((S Ù R) | Q) ÷ P(R | Q)

from 4 by Conditionalisation

6. = [P(S Ù R Ù Q) ÷ P(Q)] ÷ [P(R Ù Q) ÷ P(Q)]
from 5 by the Ratio Formula
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7. = P(S Ù R Ù Q) ÷ P(R Ù Q)

from 6 by cancellation of P(Q)

8. = P(S | (Q Ù R))

from 7 by the Ratio Formula

9. = P((Q Ù R) ® S)

from 8 by the Equation

Taking it from top to bottom and still assuming P(Q Ù R) ≠ 0,
10. P(Q ® (R ® S)) = P((Q Ù R) ® S)
from 1 and 9 by transitivity of
identiy
which is Import-Export.
The suppositional theorist welcomes this result. The equivalence
allows her to evaluate the probability of a conditional whose consequent is
itself a conditional. Without the result, she couldn’t as she can evaluate only a
conditional whose antecedent and consequent are propositional, and a
conditional isn’t propositional.
Here, assuming the suppositional theorist can derive the proof, I
disagree with Adams (1975). He claims that on the suppositional theory we
can’t evaluate conditionals whose consequents are conditionals (Adams, 1975,
pp. 30-3). This proof gives us a means to do so.
Next, we turn to prove that for any conditional Q ® R, the probability
of that conditional is equivalent to the probability of the consequent: the
Triviality Result proper.

3.4.2. Triviality
Proof (from Bennett, 2003, p. 63. Bennet himself takes the proof from
Blackburn, 1986, pp. 218-20):
11. P(R | Q) = P(Q ® R)

by the Equation
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12. = P((R Ù (Q ® R)) Ú (¬ R Ù (Q ® R)))
from 11 by T2
13. = P(R Ù (Q ® R)) + P(¬ R Ù (Q ® R))
from 12 by A3
14. = [P((Q ® R) | R) ´ P(R)] + [P((Q ® R) | ¬ R) ´ P(¬ R)]
from 13 by T3
15. = [P(R ® (Q ® R)) ´ P(R)] + [P(¬ R ® (Q ® R)) ´ P(¬ R)]
from 14 by the Equation
16. = [P((R Ù Q) ® R) ´ P(R)] + [P((¬ R Ù Q) ® R) ´ P(¬ R)]
from 15 by Import-Export
17. = [P(R | (R Ù Q)) ´ P(R)] + [P(R | (¬ R Ù Q)) ´ P(¬ R)]
from 16 by the Equation
18. = [(P(R Ù R Ù Q) ÷ P(R Ù Q)) ´ P(R)] + [(P(R Ù ¬ R Ù Q) ÷ P(¬ R
Ù Q)) ´ P(¬ R)]
from 17 by the Ratio Formula
19. = [1 ´ P(R)] + [0 ´ P(¬ R)]

from 18 by algebra, T1 and T2

20. = P(R)

from 19 by algebra

3.4.3. Avoiding the result
Now, to avoid the Triviality Result while still holding onto the Equation, the
suppositional theorist has various options, some more attractive than others.
One option is to reject 1. She might say the Equation doesn’t hold where Q
and R ranger over non-propositions and here there’s nothing preventing Q or R
from being indicative conditionals.
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Another option is to reject the move from 11 to 12. This step seems to
assume that a conditional is propositional and the suppositional theorist rejects
that assumption. The step assumes that the probability theorem T2 applies but,
for the theorem to apply, the conditionals would have to be logically
equivalent and in 11 they’re merely probabilistically so, meaning the theorem
doesn’t apply.
A third option to avoid the Triviality Result is to reject the move from
12 to 13. This step also seems to assume that a conditional is propositional.
The step assumes that the probability axiom A3 applies but, for the axiom to
apply, the conditionals would have to be logically inconsistent and here
they’re merely probabilistically so, meaning the axiom doesn’t apply. To be
logically inconsistent, the conditionals would have to have truth values and,
according to the suppositional theorist, they don’t.
Here, the second and third options are more attractive than the first.
While rejecting 1 prevents the suppositional theorist from deriving the proof
of Import-Export, rejecting the move from 11 to 12 or 12 to 13 doesn’t – and
Import-Export will serve the suppositional theorist later, as we’ll see in
Chapters 2 and 3, when she tries to explain our intuitions in the case of
apparent counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens.
Either way, according to the suppositional theorist, two propositions
don’t combine into a single proposition we judge as probably true when we
judge the second to be probably true on the supposition of the first (Edgington,
1995, p. 305). So, according to the suppositional theory it’s not the case that
‘If Josie’s at home, then she’s in New York’ can be true or false.
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Likewise, according to the suppositional theorist, it’s not the case that
classical validity is relevant when we’re talking about arguments with
indicative conditionals. Classical validity concerns itself with truthpreservation and here we’re taking indicative conditionals to be nonpropositional. Rather, when we’re talking about arguments with indicative
conditionals, probabilistic validity is relevant.
To define probabilistic validity, we define uncertainty. We define the
uncertainty of a formula Q as one minus the probability of Q (Adams, 1975, p.
3). Formally, writing ‘U’ for uncertainty, we get
U(Q) = 1 - P(Q)
Using this definition of uncertainty, we define an argument as probabilistically
valid when the uncertainty of the conclusion can’t exceed the sum of the
uncertainties of the premises (Bennett, 2003, p. 129; Adams, 1975, pp. 1-2). In
contrast to classical validity which bars falsity from entering ‘along the way
from the [true premises] to the conclusion’, probabilistic validity bars
improbability from entering along the way (Bennett, 2003, p. 129).
The departure from notions of truth and validity we know in classical
logic will prove helpful for the theory when explaining the intuitions we might
have when it comes to the Election and Barbershop paradoxes, as we’ll see in
Chapters 2 and 3. Still, some might view the departure as a demerit for the
theory, given the consequences we’ve seen above.

4. The hybrid theory
According to the hybrid theorist, the Equivalence Thesis and Adams’ Thesis
both hold true. The hybrid theory combines elements from the material theory
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and the suppositional theory. On the one hand, like the material theory, the
hybrid one concerns itself with truth. On the other hand, like the suppositional
one, the hybrid theory concerns itself with probability. For example, an
indicative conditional is true where the corresponding material one is; and it’s
assertible where the conditional probability of the consequent given the
antecedent is high. The hybrid theorist speaks of an assertible conditional as
being robust: it’s such that we wouldn’t abandon belief in it upon learning that
its antecedent is true (Jackson, 1979, pp. 569-70).

4.1. Assertibility
Note that the material theory’s concept of assertability with an ‘a’ and the
hybrid theory’s concept of assertibility with an ‘i’ aren’t the same. The
difference in vowels reflects a difference in meaning. The assert-a-bility of a
sentence depends on ‘local’ factors: ‘how important and relevant is the
information to present concerns, is the information already widely known, and
so on and so forth?’ (Jackson, 1987, p. 11). In contrast, the assert-i-bility of a
sentence depends on factors ‘governing when it is justified or warranted – in
the epistemological sense, not in a purely pragmatic one – to assert it, or, as
this comes in degrees, to what extent it is justified to assert it under the
circumstances’ (Jackson, 1987, p. 8).5
While assertibility and probability of truth go hand in hand for many
sentences, they don’t for many others, notably indicative conditionals. Let’s

5

For those familiar with the Gricean contrast between conversational
implicature and conventional implicature, I’ll add that assertability is related
to conversational implicature while assertibility is related to conventional
implicature. So here in the hybrid theory subsection, I’m talking about
conventional implicature.
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take a simpler example – one whose main connective is not a conditional but a
conjunction – first. Consider the following sentence:
Ming Bin is a good student even though he’s intelligent.
The sentence has a low assertibility but a high probability: it has a high
probability if and only if the conjunction ‘Ming Bin is a good student and is
intelligent’ has a high probability – and arguably, it does. The sentence has a
low assertibility, however, given the presence of ‘even though’. The phrase
places an ‘additional [assertibility] requirement’ on the sentence, over and
above the probability requirement – and the additional requirement isn’t
satisfied here (Jackson, 1987, p. 60).
As in the example, in the case of indicative conditionals, assertibility
doesn’t go hand in hand with probability. The assertibility of an indicative
conditional depends on the conditional probability of its consequent given its
antecedent (Jackson, 1987, p. 11). Formally, we get Adams’ Thesis, which we
saw at the very beginning and according to which the assertibility of Q ® R is
equal to the conditional probability of R given Q so long as the probability of
Q isn’t equal to zero.
If this weren’t the case (i.e. if the assertibility of indicative conditionals
did go hand in hand with probability), then the assertibility of ‘If it’s not the
case that it’s raining, then it’s raining’ would be whatever the probability of
rain were, since the probability of the conditional would be the probability of
the disjunction ‘It’s raining or it’s raining’ which in turn would be the
probability of the disjunct ‘it’s raining’.
As it is, the assertibility of the conditional ‘If it’s not the case that it’s
raining, then it’s raining’ is zero. The conditional probability of ‘it’s raining’
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given ‘it’s not the case that it’s raining’ is zero, since according to the Ratio
Formula, the probability of the consequent given the antecedent is equal to the
probability of ‘it’s not the case that it’s raining and it’s raining’ divided by
‘it’s raining’. Here, since the numerator is the probability of a contradiction, it
has a probability of zero and, regardless of the denominator, the quotient (i.e.
the conditional probability of ‘it’s raining’ given ‘it’s not the case that it’s
raining’) will be zero.
Note further that, in certain contexts, a conditional might be assert-ible but not assert-a-ble. In a silent reading room, ‘If my birth certificate is
correct, Jill is my mother’ is a case in point. Granted, generally, it might make
sense for me to say it because there’s a high probability that Jill is my mother,
given that my birth certificate is correct. However, it wouldn’t make sense for
me to say it in a room where I’m not permitted to speak (Jackson, 1987, pp.
10-1).

4.2. Returning to False-true & co and evaluating the theory
According to the hybrid theory, we can dismiss both False-true and Falsefalse on the grounds that they aren’t robust. We would abandon belief in
False-true upon learning that its antecedent is true. Supposing it true that
Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore, we would not believe that
she is also the Chancellor of Germany. Singapore and Germany are two
different countries and one person is not simultaneously the head of state in
both. Likewise, we’d abandon belief in False-false upon learning that its
antecedent is true. Supposing it true that Vienna is the capital of England, we
would not believe that Vienna is also the capital of Switzerland. England and
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Switzerland are two different countries and one city is not simultaneously the
capital of both.
As to Taller, Les compatriotes and I compatrioti, the hybrid theorist
would evaluate them in the same way as a suppositional one.
Among the merits of the theory are the following two: first, of course,
it can explain the sentences; and second, it aligns with the truth-conditional
theory of meaning. Indeed, it doesn’t face the problem the suppositional
theory did when it comes to aligning with the truth-conditional theory of
meaning. According to the hybrid theory, an indicative conditional can be true
– and so, on the truth conditional-theory of meaning, it is possible for us to
know its meaning. We need only know the conditions under which the
conditional is true.
As to the demerits, there’s the following one: it requires the seemingly
ad hoc adoption of rules to account for Import-Export preserving assertibility
(i.e. the idea that the assertibility of Q ® (R ® S) is equivalent to the
assertibility of (Q Ù R) ® S). I discuss this as the matter arises in Chapters 2
and 3.

5. Concluding
In this chapter, I outlined the topic of the thesis: theories of the
indicative conditional and apparent counterexamples to classically valid
argument forms; and I considered in turn four possible positions when it
comes to accepting or rejecting the Equivalence Thesis or Adams’ Thesis,
each position corresponding with a theory of the indicative conditional: the
material; the possible-worlds; the suppositional; and the hybrid theory.
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Along the way, I disagreed with Adams (1975). While he claims that
on the suppositional theory, we can’t evaluate an indicative conditional whose
consequent is a conditional, I included a proof that enables us to.
Next, we turn to Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ELECTION PARADOX

So far, we’ve seen various theories of the indicative conditional coming under
four headings: the material, possible-worlds, suppositional and hybrid
theories. Next, we turn to apply those theories to an alleged counterexample to
an apparently valid argument form. In this chapter, I proceed largely from first
principles in analysing Vann McGee’s alleged counterexample to modus
ponens (1985). I focus on responses the theories would offer to the trilemma
McGee’s argument presents.
The counterexample takes as context the 1980 US presidential
election. Shortly before voting day, opinion polls reveal five things:
(i) the Republican Ronald Reagan is in first place;
(ii) the Democrat Jimmy Carter is in second;
(iii) another Republican John Anderson is in third;
(iv) Reagan is substantially ahead of Carter; and
(v) Carter is substantially ahead of Anderson.
Intuitively, the following two premises seem true:
If a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan who wins it
will be Anderson; and
A Republican will win the election.
The first seems true inasmuch as there are two Republicans in the race; and,
logically, if a Republican wins and the one Republican loses, the other one
will win. Moreover, the second premise seems true inasmuch as the polls
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show the Republican Reagan in first place and far ahead of Democrat Carter in
second.
Also intuitively, however, the conclusion seems false even though it
follows by modus ponens from the two premises:
If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson (McGee, 1985, p.
462).
The conclusion seems false inasmuch as the polls show Carter in second
position – not Anderson. If Reagan loses, then presumably Carter, in second
position, would win.
This appears to be a counterexample to modus ponens. Writing A for ‘a
Republican wins’, B for ‘Reagan doesn’t win’, C for ‘Anderson wins’, ‘®’ for
the indicative conditional connective and ‘\’ for ‘therefore’, we get the
following argument6:
A ® (B ® C)
A
\B®C
The premises seem true and the second premise A is the antecedent of the first
premise A ® (B ® C). The conclusion B ® C, however, seems false even
though it’s the consequent of the first premise. Indeed, there are two possible
combinations if Reagan doesn’t win and between those two, it’s not
necessarily the case that it will be Anderson:

6

Here, I’m departing from McGee’s original wording. I’m saying e.g. the
consequent of the conclusion is ‘Anderson wins’ rather than ‘it will be
Anderson’. I don’t depart from the wording everywhere henceforth and, even
if I did, I don’t think the departure has any significant implication except,
perhaps for the reader, ease of understanding.
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Reagan

Carter

Anderson

1

Loses

Wins

Loses

2

Loses

Loses

Wins

Table 2: Possible combinations for who, between Carter and Anderson, might
win if Reagan doesn’t
It’s possible – and, given the results of the poll, likely – that if it’s not Reagan
who wins, it will be Carter.
I’m not alone in offering a discussion of McGee. Walter SinnottArmstrong, James Moor and Robert Fogelin (1986) (later ‘the Dartmouth
group’), E.J. Lowe (1987), Christian Piller (1996), Bernard D. Katz (1999),
Joseph S. Fulda (2010) and most recently Justin Bledin (2015) do so too. I’ll
cite or discuss some where relevant. That said, I won’t discuss Bledin’s
positive view, for example, as his informational theory of logic doesn’t fit
within the theories of conditionals I’m considering.
In this chapter, I refute extant solutions: while the Dartmouth group
thinks the material theory can solve the paradox and Edgington thinks the
suppositional one can solve it and Jackson thinks the hybrid one can, I’ll show
that their solutions fall short of being comprehensive.
I proceed by considering McGee’s argument in light of four theories of
the indicative conditional: the material (inspired by Grice 1961, 1975 and
1989), possible-worlds (inspired by Stalnaker (1981) and Lewis (1976)),
suppositional (inspired by Adams (1975) and Edgington (1995 and 2014)) and
hybrid (inspired by Jackson (1987)). Specifically, I examine how the theories
would solve an inconsistent triad. The three individually plausible but jointly
inconsistent theses are the following:
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#1 the premises are true and the conclusion is false;
#2 the argument is an instance of modus ponens, i.e. is one with the
form Q ® R; Q; \ R, where one has replaced the letters with
propositions; and
#3 modus ponens is valid, i.e. in any argument with the form Q ® R;
Q; \ R, the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the
conclusion.
As we’ll see, not all theories can explain the plausibility of all three theses at
once – and to solve the trilemma they must. Moreover, the theories which can
explain all three theses face problems of their own.
In section 1, I present the material theory and show that it rejects #1
but can’t explain the plausibility of the thesis without undermining itself. In
section 2, I show that the possible-worlds theory rejects #1 too but can’t
explain its plausibility. In section 3, I present the suppositional theory and
show that it rejects all three theses but can explain at most the plausibility of
two. In section 4, I present the hybrid theory and show that while it rejects #1,
it can explain the plausibility of the thesis and while the theory accepts #2 and
#3, it fails in its original mission. In section 5, I conclude.

1. The material theory
Recall that according to the material theorist, an indicative conditional Q ® R
is true if and only if the corresponding material conditional Q É R is true. In
other words, ‘If Q, then R’ is true if and only if Q is false or R is true. For
example, let Q be ‘Ben’s on sabbatical’ and R be ‘he’s in Australia’. The
indicative conditional ‘If Ben’s on sabbatical, then he’s in Australia’ is true if
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and only if it’s not the case that Ben’s on sabbatical or it’s the case that he’s in
Australia.
In this section, I show how the material theory accepts Theses #2 as
well as #3 but rejects #1 and can explain its plausibility. I show also that in
explaining the plausibility of #1, the material theory deals itself a blow: it
finds unassertable a sentence we might assert.

1.1. Accepting #2 and #3 but rejecting #1
According to the material theorist, the following holds true:
-

the argument is indeed an instance of modus ponens. We can
reduce it to the form Q ® R; Q; \ R;

-

modus ponens is valid. It’s impossible for the premises to be true
and the conclusion false; and

-

both premises are true – and so is the conclusion. Given the results
of the poll, the second premise is true. So is the conclusion
inasmuch as the antecedent of the conditional is false. And the first
premise is true inasmuch as the consequent of the conditional is
true: it’s the conclusion and, as we’ve just seen, the conclusion is
true.

The material theorist can explain nonetheless the plausibility of Thesis
#1 by appealing to the concept of assertability. Recall from Chapter 1 that
according to the Cooperative Principle, some sentences are true but not
assertable. Given a certain scenario, ‘You won’t eat those and live’ is a case in
point (Lewis, 1976, p. 306). Imagine I say the sentence while pointing at some
non-toxic mushrooms and you, deferring to my apparent mycological

38

knowledge, refrain from eating the mushrooms. I told no lie. Formally, the
sentence is true. The sentence is a negated conjunction and one of the
conjuncts (viz. ‘you eat those’) is false. Indeed, it’s not the case that you eat
the mushrooms. Nonetheless, the original sentence isn’t assertable. It wouldn’t
be a cooperative thing to say.
Looking at McGee’s argument, a material theorist would argue we take
the conclusion to be false because it’s unassertable. Again, it wouldn’t be a
cooperative thing to say. According to a maxim of cooperative
communication, one must ‘Assert the stronger rather than the weaker’ and
here I’d be asserting a weaker sentence when I could be asserting a stronger
one (Grice, 1961, p. 132). If I’m asserting the conditional because I know it
has a false antecedent, I might as well assert the negation of the antecedent.
Here, ‘It’s Reagan who wins’ is a stronger statement. ‘It’s Reagan who wins’
implies the conditional while ‘If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be
Anderson’ doesn’t imply the negation of the antecedent.
Moreover, the material theorist’s solution to a paradox of material
implication commits her to saying that the conclusion is unassertable. The
paradox arises from the fact that, according to the material theory, the
following argument is valid: ¬ Q; \ Q ® R – yet this contradicts our
intuition. For example, where Q is ‘I live until 120’ and R is ‘I die at 36’, we
get
It’s not the case that I live until 120.
Therefore, if I live until 120, then I die at 36.
Here, we might accept the premise but reject the conclusion, even though it
follows by a valid rule of inference. The material theorist solves the paradox
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by saying the conclusion isn’t assertable. When it comes to the truth values of
the antecedent and consequent, the conclusion corresponds to the False-true
conditional we saw in Chapter 1:
If Angela Merkel is the Prime Minister of Singapore, then Angela
Merkel is the Chancellor of Germany.
While False-true and the conclusion – ‘If I live until 120, then I die at 36’ –
are true, we’d only assert them because we knew that they had a false
antecedent. In each case, we might as well assert the negation of the
antecedent. So too in the case of the conclusion of McGee’s argument.
The Dartmouth group notes that the conclusion might be true while
unassertable but fails to note the following: unfortunately for the material
theorist, her solution to another paradox of material implication commits her
to saying the first premise isn’t assertable either (Sinnott-Armstrong et al.,
1986, p. 296). This paradox arises from the fact that, according to the material
theory, the following argument is valid: R; \ Q ® R – yet this contradicts our
intuition. For example, keeping Q as ‘I live until 120’ and R as ‘I die at 36’,
we get the following argument:
I die at 36.
Therefore, if I live until 120, then I die at 36.
Here, we might accept the premise but reject the conclusion, even though it
follows by a valid rule of inference. The material theorist solves the paradox
by saying the conclusion isn’t assertable. Asserting it would mean flouting the
‘Assert the stronger’ maxim (as we saw in Chapter 1, the maxim’s wording
comes from Jackson, 1979, p. 566). While the conditional is true, we’d assert
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it only because we knew it had a true consequent. In this case, we must assert
just the consequent.
Similarly, in asserting the first premise of McGee’s argument, we’d be
flouting that maxim. The whole conditional is true but the consequent is
stronger than the whole conditional. ‘If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be
Anderson’ implies ‘If a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan
who wins it will be Anderson’. ‘If it’s not Reagan who wins it will be
Anderson’ is true and thus implies any conditional which takes it as
consequent.
Moreover, the negation of the antecedent of the embedded conditional
is stronger than the whole embedded conditional. ‘It’s not the case that it’s not
Reagan who wins’ or, when we eliminate the double negation, ‘It’s Reagan
who wins’ is true and thus its negation, the original ‘It’s not Reagan who
wins’, implies any conditional which takes it as antecedent. So, in the case of
the first premise and to abide by the maxim of cooperative communication,
we’d have to assert the negation of the antecedent of the embedded
conditional. Asserting it would be asserting something stronger than not only
the embedded conditional but the whole conditional.
(Note that the other maxim we saw in Chapter 1 isn’t relevant here. In
asserting the premises, we wouldn’t be flouting the ‘Don’t assert what you
don’t believe’ maxim. Given the results of the poll, we might believe that ‘If a
Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan who wins it will be
Anderson’ and ‘If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson’.)
We see that the material theorist rejects the thesis according to which
the conclusion is false while explaining its plausibility. Yet, in introducing the
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concept of assertability to explain the plausibility, the theory faces new
problems: namely, it finds unassertable a sentence we might assert.

2. The possible-worlds theory
Recall that according to the possible-worlds theorist, an indicative conditional
‘If Q, then R’ is true in a possible world w if and only if R is true in all Qworlds which ‘differ minimally’ from w (and vacuously true when there’s no
Q-world) (Stalnaker, 1981, pp. 46-7; see also Lewis, 1973).
A Q-world is one in which the antecedent Q is true. For example, the
conditional ‘If Nicholas is at the office, then he’s in London’ is true in the
actual world just in case Nicholas is in London in all most-similar worlds in
which Nicholas is at the office.
In this section, I show how the possible-worlds theory accepts Theses
#2 and #3 and rejects #1 but can’t explain its plausibility.

2.1. Accepting Thesis #3: modus ponens is valid
According to the possible-worlds theorist, modus ponens is valid. It’s
impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. Suppose
that the premises are true and the conclusion is false in the actual world. This
means that in all most-similar worlds in which the antecedent of the first
premise is true, the consequent of the first premise is also true. Here, since the
second premise is true and the second premise is the antecedent of the first
premise, the most-similar world in which the antecedent of the first premise is
true is the actual world.

42

This leads us, however, to a contradiction. Since in the actual world the
consequent of the first premise is the conclusion and the conclusion is false,
the consequent of the first premise is also false. So, the first premise is both
true and false. We see that, according to the possible-worlds theory, in the
case of modus ponens, it’s impossible for the premises to be true while the
conclusion is false.

2.2. Accepting Thesis #2: the argument is an instance of modus ponens
Here, the possible-worlds theorist agrees with the material theorist. Yes, the
argument as we’ve formalised it is an instance of modus ponens. Having said
that, the possible-worlds theorist might argue that, in fact, the argument has
another form, namely
(A Ù B) ® C
A
\B®C
We can’t reduce this to an instance of modus ponens. According to the
possible-worlds theorist, Import-Export isn’t valid. Indeed, from (A Ù B) ® C,
we can’t necessarily derive A ® (B ® C) – and to reduce the new argument
form to an instance of modus ponens, we’d need to.
Let A be true in the actual world. Let A and C be false in all mostsimilar B-worlds. And let C be true in all most-similar (A Ù B)-worlds. (A Ù B)
® C would come out as true in the actual world. Since in all most-similar (A Ù
B)-worlds C is true, the conditional (A Ù B) ® C is true. A ® (B ® C),
however, would come out as false in the actual world. Since a most-similar A-
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world is the actual world and, in all most-similar B-worlds C is false, the
whole conditional A ® (B ® C) has a true antecedent and a false consequent.
Moreover, this new argument with a conjunction embedded in the
antecedent of the first premise is invalid according to the possible-worlds
theory. We can build a counterexample. We want in the actual world the
premises to be true but its conclusion to be false. For the first premise to be
true in the actual world, it must be the case that, in all most similar (A Ù B)worlds, C is true. For the second premise to be true, it must be the case that, in
the actual world, A is true. And for the conclusion to be false, it must be the
case that, in the most-similar B-world, C is false.
Using the same truth-values as those we used above to show that (A Ù
B) ® C and A ® (B ® C) weren’t logically equivalent, we get a
counterexample. The first premise is true. In all most-similar (A Ù B)-worlds,
C is true. The second premise is true. A is true in the actual world. The
conclusion, however, is false. In the most-similar B-world, C is false.
If the possible-worlds theorist can successfully argue the first premise
in McGee’s argument has an embedded conjunction in the antecedent, she can
reject #1 yet explain its plausibility – it appears to be a modus ponens because
it appears to have an embedded conditional in the consequent. But short of
providing a positive reason for reformulating the premise, she can’t explain
the plausibility of #1.

2.3. Rejecting Thesis #1: the premises are true and the conclusion is false
According to the possible-worlds theorist, the conclusion is false. The
conditional ‘If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson’ is true in the
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actual world just in case it’ll be Anderson who wins in all most-similar worlds
in which it’s not Reagan who does. In all most-similar worlds in which it’s not
Reagan who wins, however, it’s Carter who does. He was in second place.
With a false consequent in a most-similar antecedent-world, the conclusion is
false.
According to the possible-worlds theory, however, it’s not the case the
premises are true. While the second premise (viz. ‘A Republican will win the
election’) is true, the first isn’t. The conditional ‘If a Republican wins the
election, then if it’s not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson’ is true in the
actual world just in case if it’s not Reagan who wins it’ll be Anderson in all
most-similar worlds in which a Republican wins the election.
Now, the most-similar world in which a Republican wins the election
is the actual world itself. However, in that world, it’s not the case that if it’s
not Reagan who wins it’ll be Anderson. In a most-similar antecedent-world to
the actual world in which it’s not Reagan who wins, it’ll be Carter who does.
So, with a false consequent, the first premise is false. It’s not the case that both
premises are true (McGee, 1985, pp. 466-7).
As Thesis #1 stands, the possible-worlds theory can’t explain its
plausibility. The theory can’t, for example, appeal to the concept of
assertability as the material theory did. That concept explained the situations
where sentences were true but not assertable. Here, in contrast, we have a
sentence which the theory finds to be false yet nonetheless we’d assert.

3. The suppositional theory
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Recall that according to the suppositional theorist such as Adams and
Edgington, conditionals are things we evaluate in terms of probabilities.
Indeed, according to her, the probability of a conditional Q ® R is equal to the
conditional probability of the consequent R, on the supposition that the
antecedent Q is true so long as the probability of Q isn’t equal to zero. In
Chapter 1, we called this the Equation.
Since the suppositional theorist takes the indicative conditional to be
non-propositional, it’s clear that she’ll reject Theses #1, #2 and #3. They
imply that conditionals are propositional. She can, however, explain the
plausibility of #1 using the definition of Import-Export.
In this section, I show how the suppositional theorist does so and why
she faces a dilemma between explaining #2 and #3.

3.1. Rejecting Thesis #1: the premises are true and the conclusion is false
The suppositional theorist would explain the plausibility of #1 by saying the
uncertainty of the conclusion exceeds the sum of the uncertainties of the
premises.
To know the uncertainty of the premises, we need to know their
probabilities. To know the probability of the first premise, we calculate the
probability of ‘If a Republican wins and it’s not Reagan who does it will be
Anderson’. As we saw in Chapter 1, this formula is probabilistically
equivalent to the first premise, where two formulae are probabilistically
equivalent if and only if necessarily they have the same probability. Formally,
we get
P(A ® (B ® C)) = P((A Ù B) ® C)

46

This equivalence, which in Chapter 1 we called Import-Export, enables us to
calculate the probability of a conditional whose consequent is also a
conditional. Using it to calculate the probability of the first premise, we can
see that McGee’s argument isn’t probabilistically valid. Let’s look at a
possible probability assignment, calculate the probability of the first premise
and conclusion (we need not calculate that of the second premise as its
probability will be whatever figure we assign A) before calculating the
uncertainty of the premises and conclusion.
We know there’s a high probability that a Republican will win the
election so let P(A) = 0.80. We know there’s a low probability that it’s not
Reagan who wins so let P(B) = 0.24. We know there’s also a low probability
that it’ll be Anderson who wins. Moreover, we know this probability is even
lower than the probability that it’s not Reagan who wins because if it’s not
Reagan who wins it’ll be – not Anderson but – Carter so let P(C) = 0.04. We
know the probability that a Republican wins and it’s not Reagan is low and is
close to the probability that a Republican wins and it’s not Reagan but
Anderson. The probability of a Republican other than Reagan winning is close
to zero so let P(A Ù B) = 0.04 and P(A Ù B Ù C) = 0.04 as well. Finally, we
know the probability of it being not Reagan who wins but Anderson is also
close to zero so let P(B Ù C) = 0.04.
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Figure 1: Venn diagram of the Election Paradox

If I’m letting P(C), P(A Ù B), P(A Ù B Ù C) P(B Ù C) each to be equal
to 0.04, it’s because I’m taking the probability of a Republican other than
Reagan or Anderson winning to be zero – and so I’m taking ‘Anderson wins’,
‘A Republican wins and it’s not Reagan’, ‘A Republican wins and it’s not
Reagan but it’s Anderson’ and ‘It’s not Reagan who wins but Anderson wins’
to be the same.
Now, turning to the first premise: from Import-Export and the
Equation, we know that P(A ® (B ® C)) is equal to P(C | (A Ù B)). From this
and the Ratio Formula, we know that P(C | (A Ù B)) is equal to P(A Ù B Ù C) ÷
P (A Ù B). Introducing our numbers, we find that the probability of the first
premise is 1. This is consistent with our intuition that the first premise has a
high probability.
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Next, turning to the conclusion: from the Equation, we know that P(B
® C) is equal to P(C | B). From this and the Ratio Formula, we know that P(C
| B) is equal to P(B Ù C) ÷ P(B). Introducing our numbers, we find that the
probability of the conclusion is 0.17. This is consistent with our intuition that
the conclusion has a low probability.
Finally, we move to calculating the uncertainty of the premises and
conclusion. From our definition of uncertainty, the uncertainty of the first
premise is 1 - P(A ® (B ® C)) = 0, that of the second is 1 - P(A) = 0.20 and
that of the conclusion is 1 - P(B ® C) = 0.83. We see that the argument isn’t
probabilistically valid. The uncertainty of the conclusion (= 0.83) exceeds the
sum of the uncertainties of the premises (= 0 + 0.2 = 0.2). This being so, the
suppositional theorist can explain the plausibility of #1. We might take the
premises to be true and the conclusion false because the uncertainty of the
conclusion can exceed the sum of the uncertainties of the premises.

3.2. Rejecting Thesis #3: modus ponens is valid
Depending on how she defines modus ponens, the argument form is or isn’t
probabilistically valid according to the suppositional theorist. If she defines it
as requiring necessarily that we replace each of the letters in Q ® R; Q; \ R
with a proposition (i.e. a formula with a truth-value/not containing an
indicative conditional), then it’s probabilistically valid. Let’s call the argument
meeting the definition ‘simple modus ponens’. To prove the validity of simple
modus ponens, we derive the following lemma:

Lemma: Conditional Contradiction
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Assuming P(Q) ≠ 0, the probability of ¬ R given Q is equal to one minus the
probability of R given Q:
1. P(Q) ÷ P(Q) = 1

by algebra

2. [P((Q Ù R) Ú (Q Ù ¬ R))] ÷ [P(Q)] = 1
from 1 by T2 (which we saw in
Chapter 1 subsection 3.4. and
according to which P(A) = P(B)
if and only if A and B are
equivalent)
3. [P(Q Ù R) + P(Q Ù ¬ R)] ÷ [P(Q)] = 1
from 2 by Finite Additivity
4. [P(Q Ù R) ÷ P(Q)] + [P(Q Ù ¬ R) ÷ P(Q)] = 1
from 3 by algebra
5. P(R | Q) + P(¬ R | Q) = 1

from 4 by the Ratio Formula

6. P(¬ R | Q) = 1 - P(R | Q)

from 5 by algebra

Using this lemma and still assuming that P(Q) isn’t zero, we prove the
probabilistic validity of modus ponens where the conclusion is a proposition
(i.e. doesn’t contain an indicative conditional). The first step is to prove the
uncertainty of an indicative conditional is equal to the quotient of the
uncertainty of the corresponding material conditional divided by the
probability of the antecedent. To do so, we appeal to not only Conditional
Contradiction but also Uncertainty, the Ratio Formula and the equivalence of
Q É R and ¬ (Q Ù ¬ R):
1. U(Q ® R) = 1 - P(Q ® R)

by Uncertainty

2. = 1 - P(R | Q)

from 1 by the Equation
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3. = P(¬ R | Q)
from

2

by

Conditional

Contradiction
4. = [P(Q Ù ¬ R)] ÷ [P(Q)]

from 3 by Ratio Formula

5. = [1 - P(¬ (Q Ù ¬ R))] ÷ [P(Q)]
from

4

by

Conditional

Contradiction
6. = [U(¬ (Q Ù ¬ R))] ÷ [P(Q)]

from 5 by Uncertainty

7. = [U(Q É R)] ÷ [P(Q)]

from 6 by T2

Taking it from top to bottom,
8. U(Q ® R) = [U(Q É R)] ÷ [P(Q)]
from 1 and 7 by transitivity of
identity

(this

corresponds

to

Bennett’s ‘fourth result’ (2003, p.
134)).
So far, we’ve proved the uncertainty of an indicative conditional is
equal to the quotient of the uncertainty of the corresponding material
conditional divided by the probability of the antecedent. Building on the first
step, the second is to prove that an indicative conditional probabilistically
entails a material one. In other words, the uncertainty of a material conditional
Q É R can’t exceed the uncertainty of the corresponding indicative one Q ®
R. To prove this, we appeal to algebra:
9. [U(Q ® R)] ´ [P(Q)] = U(Q É R) from 8 by algebra
10. U(Q ® R) ³ U(Q É R)
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from 9 by algebra (because P(Q)
is less than or equal to 1)
By now, we’ve proved that an indicative conditional probabilistically
entails a material one. Building on this previous step, the final one is to prove
that an indicative conditional and its antecedent probabilistically entail the
consequent. In other words, the uncertainty of the consequent can’t exceed the
sum of the uncertainties of the conditional and the antecedent. To prove this,
we appeal to algebra again:
11. U(Q) + U(Q É R) ³ U(R)

because Q and Q É R entail R

12. U(Q É R) ³ U(R) - U(Q)

from 11 by algebra

13. U(Q ® R) ³ U(R) - U(Q)

from 10 and 12 by algebra

14. U(Q ® R) + U(Q) ³ U(R)
from 13 by algebra (this verifies
Bennett’s

‘Security

Thesis’

(2003, p. 141))
And now we’ve proved what we wanted to prove. Line 14 says modus
ponens is probabilistically valid for the indicative conditional according to the
suppositional theorist at least when the conclusion is propositional, i.e. simple
modus ponens. It tells us it’s not the case the uncertainty of the conclusion in a
modus ponens can be greater than the sum of the uncertainties of the premises.
If, however, the suppositional theorist defines modus ponens as not
requiring necessarily a propositional conclusion (i.e. allowing that we
substitute a conditional in place of R in the argument Q ® R; Q; \ R), then it
isn’t probabilistically valid. Let’s call the argument which this definition
includes but that of simple modus ponens doesn’t ‘complex modus ponens’.
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As we saw, McGee’s argument – a complex modus ponens with its
conclusion being a conditional – isn’t probabilistically valid. It’s possible for
the uncertainty of the conclusion to exceed the sum of the uncertainties of the
premises. McGee’s argument would be a counterexample to the probabilistic
validity of modus ponens.
While we might think we could adapt the proof we’ve just seen to
prove the probabilistic validity of an argument where the conclusion is an
indicative conditional, we’d be wrong. The non-propositional nature of
indicative conditionals bars us from doing so. Specifically, it bars us from
adapting Conditional Contradiction on which the proof relies. Consider the
first three lines of the lemma where we’ve replaced R with R ® S:
1. P(Q) ÷ P(Q) = 1

by algebra

2. [P((Q Ù (R ® S)) Ú (Q Ù ¬ (R ® S)))] ÷ [P(Q)] = 1
from 1 by the logical equivalence
theorem T2
3. [P(Q Ù (R ® S)) + P(Q Ù ¬ (R ® S))] ÷ [P(Q)] = 1
from 2 by Finite Additivity
2 no longer follows from 1 by T2. Q is a proposition but (Q Ù (R ® S)) Ú (Q Ù
¬ (R ® S)) isn’t because it contains indicative conditionals and indicative
conditionals aren’t propositional. This being so, Q and (Q Ù (R ® S)) Ú (Q Ù
¬ (R ® S)) can’t be logically equivalent and we can’t derive (Q Ù (R ® S)) Ú
(Q Ù ¬ (R ® S)) from Q by T2.
Similarly, 3 no longer follows from 2 by Finite Additivity. Q Ù (R ®
S) and Q Ù ¬ (R ® S) contain conditionals and conditionals aren’t
propositional. Strictly speaking, then, they can’t be logically inconsistent and
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so we can’t derive [P(Q Ù (R ® S)) + P(Q Ù ¬ (R ® S))] from [P((Q Ù (R ®
S)) Ú (Q Ù ¬ (R ® S)))] by Finite Additivity because that rule applies to
logically inconsistent statements.
So here, we see a significant divergence between the classical
logician’s conception of modus ponens and the suppositional theorist’s. For
the classical logician, modus ponens is valid, whether the conclusion is itself a
conditional or not. For the suppositional theorist, on the other hand, whether
modus ponens is valid depends on whether she limits her definition to simple
or complex instances.
If she defines modus ponens as allowing that the conclusion be a
conditional, i.e. allowing a non-propositional conclusion, then she’ll find
modus ponens probabilistically invalid. If she defines it as barring that the
conclusion be a conditional, i.e. barring a non-propositional conclusion, then
she’ll find modus ponens probabilistically valid.

3.3. Rejecting Thesis #2: the argument is an instance of modus ponens
The suppositional theorist rejects #2. It’s not that she denies the second
premise is the antecedent of the first or the conclusion is the consequent of the
first. Rather, it’s that #2 implies that the conclusion of McGee’s argument –
one with the form Q ® R; Q; \ R – as being a proposition and here, being a
conditional, the conclusion isn’t a proposition.
So, according to the suppositional theorist, McGee’s argument is no
more an instance of modus ponens than the following argument, in which the
conclusion is an imperative:
If it’s sunny, then go outside!
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It’s sunny.
Therefore, go outside!
Here, again, the conclusion – ‘Go outside!’ – is non-propositional and so the
whole argument can’t be an instance of modus ponens according to the
definition which #2 offers.
To be clear, the suppositional theorist here and that in Piller (1996)
each reject #2 for a different reason. The suppositional theorist here rejects #2
on the grounds that it requires the conclusion in a modus ponens to be
propositional and that in McGee’s argument isn’t. The suppositional theorist
in Piller (viz. she who subscribes to the ‘Adams-Appiah theory’), however,
rejects #2 on the grounds that the second premise isn’t the antecedent of the
first and thus McGee can’t apply modus ponens ‘in the way he intended to’
(Piller, 1996, p. 40).
Indeed, according to her, the second premise is A and the antecedent of
the first is A Ù B. Piller’s suppositional theorist claims that ‘what seems to be
an embedded conditional is, in fact, no embedded conditional. McGee’s
premise seems to be of the form “If A, then if B, then C” but is in fact of the
form “If A and B, then C”’ (Piller, 1996, p. 40 [I’ve changed the letters]).
(Edgington agrees (1995, p. 284 and 2014).) This is because there is no
formula to calculate the probability of an embedded conditional and this with
good reason: ‘Conditionals cannot be embedded in other conditionals. The
parts of a conditional, its antecedent and its consequent, must have truthvalues. But because conditionals do not have truth-values, conditionals cannot
be part of conditionals’ (Piller, 1996, p. 40).
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Since Piller (1996) published his paper, there have been developments.
We know now how to calculate the probability of an embedded conditional.
As we’ve seen above, the probability of A ® (B ® C) is equal to the
probability of (A Ù B) ® C – and there’s a formula for calculating the
probability of the latter. So here, rather than reject #2 on the grounds that the
conditionals can’t embed and the second premise isn’t the antecedent of the
first, our suppositional theorist rejects it on the grounds that the conclusion of
a modus ponens must be propositional and the conclusion in McGee’s
argument isn’t.
Now, depending on how she defines modus ponens, our suppositional
theorist here will find that the argument is or isn’t an instance of modus
ponens. If she defines modus ponens as having the form Q ® R; Q; \ R and
allowing the embedding of conditionals, then she’ll find that McGee’s
argument is equivalent to modus ponens. Indeed, the argument would meet the
definition.
If, however, she defines modus ponens as having the from Q ® R; Q;
\ R and barring the embedding of conditionals, then she’ll find McGee’s
argument isn’t equivalent to modus ponens. Indeed, in his argument, the R is a
conditional.
And now she faces a dilemma. If she chooses the more-inclusive
definition, then she can explain the plausibility of #2: it mightn’t be the case
that we’re replacing Q ® R; Q; \ R with propositions but we do, according to
her theory, have a modus ponens. In choosing the more-inclusive definition,
however, she bars herself from explaining the plausibility of #3. As we saw,
modus ponens with embedded conditionals is probabilistically invalid.
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If, conversely, she chooses the less-inclusive definition, then she can
definition, then she can explain the plausibility of #3. She has a proof that
modus ponens without embedded conditionals is valid. Similarly, however, in
choosing the less-inclusive definition, she bars herself from explaining the
plausibility of #2.
We see that the suppositional theorist rejects #1, #2 and #3 and while
she can explain #1, she must choose between explaining #2 and #3.

4. The hybrid theory
Recall that the hybrid theory combines elements from the material theory and
the suppositional theory. On the one hand, like the material theory, the hybrid
one concerns itself with truth. On the other hand, like the suppositional theory,
the hybrid one concerns itself with probability. For example, an indicative
conditional is true where the corresponding material one is; and it’s assertible
where the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is
high. Also recall that assertibility is different from assertability (see Chapter
1).
Now, in this section, I show that the hybrid theorist accepts Theses #2
as well as #3 but rejects #1 while explaining its plausibility.

4.1. Rejecting Thesis #1: the premises are true and the conclusion is false
The hybrid theorist takes the first conjunct in #1 to be true. Indeed, according
to her, the premises are true – and this for the same reason as the material
theorist takes them to be true. Moreover, just as the premises are probable
according to the suppositional theory, they are assertible according to the
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hybrid one. The assertibility of Q ® (R ® S) is exactly the same as that of the
corresponding sentence of the form (Q Ù R) ® S (Jackson, 1987, p. 130).
According to the hybrid theory, Import-Export preserves not only truth but
also assertibility.
The adoption of Import-Export might seem ad hoc. Treating
conditionals with the form Q ® (R ® S) requires the introduction of extra
rules. As Jackson admits,
There is no obvious, inevitable answer as to what supplemented
equivalence theorists [who believe that ® and É are not identical in
meaning inasmuch as ® carries a ‘conventional signal’ which É
doesn’t] should say about ordinary language occurrences of indicative
conditionals within the scope of indicative conditionals. The matter
needs further investigation which, if all goes well, will lead to a
further, detachable, bit of theory designed to handle the more complex
constructions. (1987, p. 128, emphasis in original)
In contrast, the suppositional theory could more easily account for ImportExport thanks to Conditional Contradiction.
The hybrid theorist can’t just rely on truth-functional equivalences and
say that since É is equivalent to ® and Q É (R É S) is equivalent to (Q Ù R) É
S, the assertibility of Q ® (R ® S) is equivalent to the assertibility of (Q Ù R)
® S. The theorist denies the possibility of relying on them in the case of
simple conditionals. ‘If Q, then R’ and ‘Not-Q or R’ might have the same truth
table but there’s a difference in practice between the two. In practice, we’ll
assert ‘If Q, then R’ when the probability of R given Q is high. The same isn’t
true about ‘Not-Q or R’.
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Likewise, the hybrid theorist can’t just claim the embedded conditional
is material. Jackson acknowledges this: ‘Sometimes there is no theory to be
had for an “if” in the scope of an “if”; other times there is a theory, and one
consonant with the supplemented equivalence theory, but it is not obtained by
simply treating the “®” of smallest scope as “É”’ (Jackson, 1987, p. 129).
We’ll return to this point when discussing #2 and a suggestion Lowe (1987)
makes.
Now, Jackson reaches the conclusion that Import-Export preserves
assertibility based on the fact that he can’t find a counterexample. He sets out
to look for one in ‘the place to look for [them]’, namely, ‘the cases where (Q Ù
R) ® S is highly assertible, Q is highly assertible, but (R ® S) is highly
unassertible’ in vain (Jackson, 1987, pp. 130-1; see also Bennett, 2003, pp. 99100).
That said, the hybrid theorist might be able to adapt the suppositional
theorist’s proof of Import-Export. To do so, the hybrid theorist must edit lines
1, 2, 3 and 9 such that the proof relies on not the Equation (which the hybrid
theory doesn’t assume) but Adams’ Thesis (which it does):
Line 1 will equate the assertibility of A ® (B ® C) with the
probability of B ® C given A, citing Adams’ Thesis as justification;
Line 2 will derive the posterior assertibility of B ® C after we discover
A from 1 by Conditionalisation;
Line 3 will derive the posterior probability of C given B after we
discover A from 2 by Adams’ Thesis; and
Line 9 will derive the assertibility of (A Ù B) ® C from 8 by Adams’
Thesis.
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Of course, the proof assumes the current assertibility of A ® (B ® C)
is equal to the future assertibility of B ® C after we find out that A. In other
words, the proof assumes we can rely on Conditionalisation when talking
about not probability but assertibility: we are saying the assertibility of B ® C
after we find out that A is equal to the conditional probability of B ® C given
A. Whether the hybrid theorist would assume this is unclear. But it seems
plausible that she might, because assertion is the outward expression of belief
– and if she does assume this, she can show that the premises are assertible.
Next, the hybrid theorist takes the second conjunct in #1 to be false.
Indeed, according to her, it’s not the case that the conclusion is false. Like the
material theorist, the hybrid one takes the conclusion to be true, because it has
a false antecedent. Nonetheless, the hybrid theorist can explain the plausibility
of the thesis. While the conclusion might be true, it isn’t assertible. As the
suppositional theorist showed, the consequent has a low probability given the
antecedent. From this and Adams’ Thesis, we know that the conclusion has a
low assertibility (Piller, 1996, p. 43).

4.2. Accepting Thesis #3: modus ponens is valid
The hybrid theorist agrees that modus ponens preserves truth. She would have
to concede, however, that it doesn’t preserve assertibility (Piller, 1996, p. 44).
While the suppositional theorist choosing the less-inclusive definition could
say that McGee’s argument, although probabilistically invalid, wasn’t a true
counterexample to modus ponens, the hybrid theory can’t. Strictly speaking
(and we’ll return to this in subsection 4.3), McGee’s argument is an instance
of modus ponens. The conclusion is a proposition and true. Thus the hybrid
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theorist must say that McGee’s argument, despite not showing that modus
ponens fails to preserve truth, shows that modus ponens fails to preserve
assertibility.
The hybrid theorist can’t adapt the suppositional one’s proof that
modus ponens preserves probability such that it proves modus ponens
preserves assertibility. Dashing any hope of this is the fact that we can’t
equate unassertibility with uncertainty. Granted, rather than define uncertainty,
we can define unassertibility as follows:
Assuming that one is the maximum degree of assertibility, for any
formula Q, the unassertibility of Q is equal to the remainder of one
minus the assertibility of Q.
Moreover, we can edit the lemma such that it’s about unassertibility and line 7
equates the assertibility of Q ® ¬ R with the remainder of one minus the
assertibility of Q ® R, citing Adams’ Thesis. And we can edit the proof such
that:
Line 1 equates the unassertibility of Q ® ¬ R with the remainder of
one minus the assertibility of Q ® R, citing the definition of
unassertibility;
Line 2 derives the remainder of one minus the assertibility of R given
Q by Adams’ Thesis rather than the Equation;
Line 3 derives the assertibility of Q ® ¬ R, from 1 by Unassertibility;
Line 4 cites again Adams’ Thesis rather than the Equation;
Line 9 equates the unassertibility of Q ® R with the quotient of the
uncertainty of Q É R divided by the probability of Q;
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Line 10 equates the product of the unassertibility of Q ® R multiplied
by the probability of Q with the uncertainty of Q É R; and
Line 11 finds the unassertibility of Q ® R to be greater than or equal
to the uncertainty of Q É R.
The problem is that we’ve proved something other than what we want. We
want line 11 to find the unassertibility of Q ® R to be greater than or equal to
the unassertibility of Q É R. Instead, we’ve proved the unassertibility of Q ®
R to be greater than or equal to the uncertainty of Q É R.
The hybrid theorist might try to patch up her theory by saying that the
uncertainty of Q É R is equal to the unassertibility of Q É R. But this would
be a false start. We know uncertainty and unassertibility can come apart. Just
as probability of truth and assertibility don’t go hand in hand for indicative
conditionals, neither do their counterparts uncertainty and unassertibility. So
in line 11, because R itself is an indicative conditional (as the conclusion is in
McGee’s argument), the unassertibility of Q É R might well be greater than
the uncertainty of Q É R.

4.3. Accepting Thesis #2: the argument is an instance of modus ponens
According to the hybrid theorist, the argument is an instance of modus ponens
– and this, again, for the same reason as the material theorist takes it to be an
instance of modus ponens.
Granted, like the suppositional theory, the hybrid one concerns itself
with conditional probability, taking a conditional to be assertible where the
conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is high. Unlike
the suppositional theory, however, the hybrid one concerns itself also with
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truth, taking an indicative conditional to have the truth value of the
corresponding material conditional. And because of this, McGee’s argument
with its conditional conclusion meets the definition of modus ponens in #2.
We can see the tenet according to which conditionals are propositional
as endowing the hybrid theory with an advantage and a disadvantage. On the
one hand, it allows the theory to be consistent with the truth-conditional theory
of meaning. Unlike the suppositional theory, it can say that to know the
meaning of a conditional is to know what it takes for that conditional to be
true. On the other, it prevents the theory from dismissing McGee’s argument
as a counterexample to modus ponens. McGee’s argument constitutes an
instance of modus ponens and fails to preserve assertibility.
The hybrid theorist can’t escape the problem by saying:
The best reply, in my view, to this argument points out that we
sometimes need to do a certain amount of massaging of surface
linguistic structure in order to display logical form. … Now it is
plausible that the second premise of the putative counter-example
should strictly be written as ‘If a Republican wins and Reagan does not
win, then Anderson will.’ The sentence whose surface form is A ® (B
® C) has logical form (A Ù B) ® C. Hence, the alleged counterexample is not really an instance of modus ponens. (Jackson, 2006, p.
216, [I’ve edited the symbols for consistency])
The claim that a sentence whose surface form is A ® (B ® C) has the logical
form (A Ù B) ® C is ad hoc. Nonetheless, the hybrid theorist takes the two
propositions to be logically equivalent – and, in doing so, doesn’t help the
hybrid theory. If the two are logically equivalent, then it remains for the
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theorist to explain McGee’s argument as a counterexample to modus ponens.
Strictly speaking, an argument whose first premise is (A Ù B) ® C, second is
A and conclusion is B ® C is logically equivalent to a modus ponens: relying
on the logical equivalent of (A Ù B) ® C and A ® (B ® C), we can derive an
argument whose second premise is the antecedent of the first and whose
conclusion is the consequent of the first.
This is a particularly hard blow for the theory because one of its
raisons d’être was to ensure that modus ponens preserved assertibility
(Jackson, 1987, p. 29). Yet here we see that modus ponens doesn’t. Efforts to
save the theory by saying that the first premise wasn’t assertible in the first
place would be in vain. The probability of the consequent given the antecedent
is high. Moreover, we take the premise to be assertible. (Here, I go further
than Piller who wrote before Jackson published his self-described ‘best reply’
to McGee (Jackson, 2006, p. 216). Piller says Jackson can solve the paradox,
assuming his theory is correct. I say Jackson can’t without abandoning one of
the most important motivations for devising his theory.)
Now, one might think that the hybrid theorist might have a way out.
The response above, of course, assumes that, according to the hybrid theory,
we can embed indicative conditionals in indicative conditionals. If we reject
the idea, however, we would reject Thesis #2. Instead of seeing the conclusion
as the consequent of the first premise, we might, as Lowe does, see the
conclusion as an indicative conditional and the consequent of the first as a
material one:
A ® (B É C)
A
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\B®C
Note that, in what follows, I’ll be talking about a fictional Lowe. While
the real one makes no mention of probability, I’m casting the fictional one as a
hybrid theorist who will, as we’ll see in a counterexample, appeal to Adams’
Thesis. Think ‘A New Lowe’, if you will.
Now, one reason, perhaps, for rejecting the embedding of indicative
conditionals is that they carry implicatures and implicatures don’t survive all
embeddings. For example, if we say ‘He’s good at maths but not chess’, we’re
committed to the implicature according to which there’s a contrast between
being good at maths and being good at chess. However, if we say ‘He believes
he’s good at maths but not chess’, we’re not committed to that implicature.
Similarly, then, when we say ‘If B, then C’, we might be committed to a set of
implicatures while when we say ‘If A, then if B, then C’ we are not committed
to the same set.7
That said, implicatures do survive some embeddings. For example, if
we say ‘She knows she’s good at maths but not chess’, we’re committed to the
implicature to which we weren’t committed in ‘He believes he’s good at
maths but not chess’. Namely, we’re committed to the implicature according
to which there’s a contrast between being good at maths and being good at
chess.
Now, coming back to Lowe where we left him, i.e. before I tried to
reconstruct his motivation for rejecting the embedding of indicative

7

Note that some theorists – such as e.g. Christopher Potts – classify ‘but’ as a
conventional implicature, and think that one distinguishing feature of
conventional implicatures is that they do project out of pretty much all
embeddings. I don’t think this affects the larger points here but the interested
reader can turn to Potts (2004).
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conditionals – he does not argue that the first premise has the form A ® (B É
C). Instead, he claims, the burden of proof is on McGee’s shoulders to show
that the first premise does not have this form. For Lowe,
it is enough that A ® (B É C) is not a patently implausible
interpretation. … The burden of proof lies rather with McGee to show
that his first premise genuinely is of the form A ® (B ® C), since it is
he who is relying on this assumption in order to challenge a deeply
rooted principle of deductive inference. (1987, p. 46 [I’ve changed the
letters])
As far as Lowe sees,
a reasonable degree of logical conservatism entitles us to see in McGee’s
example not a breakdown of modus ponens but rather a demonstration
that the English indicative conditional is sometimes interpretable as a
material conditional and sometimes not. (1987, p. 46)
There’s a problem with this response. The burden of proof does lie with
Lowe and he doesn’t discharge it. To reject #2 and prove that McGee’s
argument isn’t a modus ponens, it is not enough to provide an interpretation of
the first premise which is not patently implausible. Just because it’s not
patently implausible that I’m currently at the library doesn’t undermine the
fact that I’m not. To begin to defend modus ponens as an argument which
preserves assertibility, Lowe must provide some positive reason for believing
that the first premise has the form A ® (B É C). Not having done so, Lowe
fails to respond to McGee.
If he could provide a reason, then one might think his theory an
attractive one. He could explain the plausibility of the other two Theses. He’d

66

accept #1 according to which the premises are true and the conclusion false.
He finds the first premise assertable inasmuch as, on his formulation, it
corresponds to ‘If a Republican wins the election, then either it will be Reagan
who wins or it will be Anderson’ (Lowe, 1987, p. 45). He gives no reason to
find the second premise unassertible but does give one to find the conclusion
so:
no conversational point is normally served by asserting something of the
form B É C where B and C are reasonably believed to be false, any more
than it is by asserting something of the equivalent form ¬ B Ú C. This is
indeed why, although the circumstances of McGee’s example it would
be reasonable to believe the disjunction
Either it will be Reagan who wins the election or it will be
Anderson,
it would not be conversationally appropriate to assert this. (Lowe, 1987,
p. 46, emphases in original)
Considering probabilities, we can bear out Lowe’s position – finding the
premises assertible but the conclusion not so, where the embedded connective
in the first premise is a material conditional but the main connective in the
conclusion is an indicative one. Adopting where necessary the numbers we
used in the suppositional theory section (subsection 3.1), we can calculate the
following probabilities for the premises and conclusion.
Turning to the first premise: from Adams’ Thesis, we know that the
assertibility of A ® (B É C) is equal to P((B É C) | A). From material
implication, we know that P((B É C) | A) is equal to P((¬ B Ú C) | A). After
all, (B É C) is logically equivalent to (¬ B Ú C). Next, applying the Ratio
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Formula, we know that P((¬ B Ú C) | A) is equal to P((¬ B Ú C) Ù A) ÷ P(A).
From the stipulation that ¬ B Ú C is equal to A, we know that P((¬ B Ú C) Ù
A) ÷ P(A) is equal to P(A Ù A) ÷ P(A). This stipulation that the probability that
‘Reagan wins or Anderson does’ is equivalent to the probability that ‘A
Republican wins’ isn’t controversial: there are two Republicans running in our
scenario, Reagan and Anderson. And applying algebra, we calculate that P(A
Ù A) ÷ P(A) is equal to P(A) ÷ P(A).
Taking it from top to bottom, by artithmetic, the assertibility of A ® (B
É C) is equal to P(A) ÷ P(A). So, whatever P(A) (so long as it isn’t zero), the
probability of the first premise is 1.
Turning to the second premise: its probability is 0.8. The second premise
is A to which, in subsection 3.1. of this chapter, we’d assigned this high
probability.
And turning to the conclusion: its probability is 0.17. The conclusion is
B ® C which, as we calculated in subsection 3.1. of this chapter also, has a
low probability.
Lowe would accept #3 according to which modus ponens is valid. As he
writes, ‘it is more reasonable to appeal to the validity of modus ponens to
show that McGee has misinterpreted the form of one of the sentences he
invokes in his example’ (Lowe, 1987, p. 46). Still, Lowe would have to
provide a positive reason for believing that the first premise has the form A ®
(B É C).
But Lowe’s theory is no more attractive than that of his hybrid theorist
colleague who took the argument to have the form A ® (B ® C); A; \ B ®
C. Lowe can’t say modus ponens preserves assertibility either. If McGee’s
68

argument were a modus ponens (i.e. the connective in the conclusion were not
® but É and thereby the same connective as that in the consequent of the first
premise), then the assertibility of the conclusion could be low still while those
of the premises were high. Line 1 of the counterexample would say that the
assertibility of (B É C) is equal to the probability of C given B and from here
the calculation would be the same as that for the other hybrid theorist. (Even
the non-fictional version of Lowe, as we saw earlier in this subsection, finds
that it wouldn’t be appropriate to assert the disjunction version of the
conclusion.)

5. Concluding
In this chapter, I sought to analyse largely from first principles Vann McGee’s
alleged counterexample to modus ponens. I focused on responses the material,
possible-worlds, suppositional and hybrid theories of the indicative
conditional would offer to the trilemma McGee’s argument presents. The
theses of the trilemma were:
#1 the premises are true and the conclusion is false;
#2 the argument is an instance of modus ponens; and
#3 modus ponens is valid.
We saw that the material theorist respond by rejecting #1. According to her,
the conclusion is true inasmuch as it had a false antecedent. In trying to
explain the plausibility of #1 by defending a surrogate thesis, however, the
theorist introduced new problems.
Similarly, the possible-worlds theorist responded by rejecting #1.
According to her, the first premise isn’t true. In trying to explain the

69

plausibility of #1, however, the theorist offered a new formulation of the first
premise but gave no positive reason for our accepting that new formulation.
The suppositional theorist responded to the trilemma by rejecting all
theses. As she takes indicative conditionals to be non-propositional, she finds
it’s not the case that the premises are true or the conclusion false, that the
argument is an instance of modus ponens, or that modus ponens preserves
truth. While she could explain the plausibility of #1, she had to choose
between explaining #2 and #3. Prevent her from explaining all three was the
fact that however she defined modus ponens, her definition barred her from
finding either that modus ponens is probabilistically valid or McGee’s
argument is an instance of modus ponens.
And the hybrid theorist responded by rejecting #1. For the same reason
as the material theorist, the hybrid one finds the conclusion to be true: it has a
false antecedent. The theory’s tenet according to which conditionals are
propositional proved an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, it
allowed the theory to remain consistent with the truth-functional account of
meaning. On the other hand, however, it implied an unwelcome result:
according to the theory, McGee’s argument was an instance of modus ponens
and probabilistically invalid – and this, when one of the theory’s raisons d’être
was to guarantee the probabilistic validity of modus ponens.
Along the way, I disagreed with Piller (1996) and a fictional Lowe
(1987). While Piller’s suppositional theorist rejects #2 on the grounds that the
second premise in McGee’s argument (viz. A) isn’t the antecedent of the first
(viz. A Ù B), mine does so – if at all – on the grounds that the conclusion and
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consequent of the second premise aren’t propositional. And while Lowe takes
the hybrid theory to solve the paradox, I showed a flaw in his argument.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BARBERSHOP PARADOX

“‘What, nothing to do?’ said Uncle Jim. ‘Then come along with me down to
Allen’s. And you can just take a turn while I get myself shaved’” (Carroll,
1894, p. 436). So begins Lewis Carroll’s ‘ornamental presentment’ of an
apparent counterexample to the validity of modus tollens.
Despite the progress logicians made on conditionals in the centuries
following its publication and the attempts logicians made at offering a
solution, the paradox remained without one. In this chapter, as I did in the case
of McGee’s in the previous one, I proceed largely from first principles in
analysing Carroll’s argument. I focus on the responses four theories of the
indicative conditional would offer to the trilemma Carroll’s argument
presents.
Allen’s is a shop where three barbers work: the eponymous Allen,
Brown and Carr. The narrator, the young ‘Cub’, heads there with his two
uncles, Jim and Joe. On the way, Uncle Joe makes a claim: ‘Carr’s certain to
be in’ and proceeds to prove it (Carroll, 1894, p. 436).
First, he submits that ‘If Carr is out, it follows that if Allen is out
Brown must be in’ (Carroll, 1894, p. 436, emphasis in original). Uncle Jim
grants this conditional: ‘Of course he must … or there’d be nobody to mind
the shop’ (Carroll, 1894, p. 436). Next, Uncle Joe submits that ‘the
Hypothetical “if Allen is out Brown is out” is always in force’ (Carroll, 1894,
p. 437, emphasis in original). Again, Uncle Jim grants the conditional: ‘ever
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since he had that fever [Allen]’s been so nervous about going out alone, he
always takes Brown with him’ (Carroll, 1894, p. 437).
From these two conditionals, ostensibly by modus tollens, Uncle Joe
concludes ‘Therefore Carr cannot be out’ (Carroll, 1894, p. 437, emphasis in
original). This leaves Uncle Jim looking ‘thoroughly puzzled’ (Carroll, 1894,
p. 437).
Now, if we formalise the argument without modals and let C be ‘Carr
is out’, A be ‘Allen is out’, B be ‘Brown is in’, we get:
C ® (A ® B)
(A ® ¬ B)
\¬C
Of course, according to classical logic, this isn’t an instance of modus tollens.
While the conclusion might be the contradictory of the antecedent of the first
premise, the second premise isn’t the contradictory of the consequent of the
first. To transform the argument into a modus tollens while maintaining the
formalisation of the first premise, we’d rewrite the second as
¬ (A ® B)
If I’m not formalising the second premise in this way, i.e. if I’m formalising
the negation as taking not wide but narrow scope, it’s for three reasons:
(i) the negation in Carroll’s original argument takes narrow scope.
Uncle Joe says ‘If Allen is out Brown is out’ or in other words ‘If
Allen is out Brown is not in’ (narrow). He doesn’t say ‘It’s not the case
that if Allen is out Brown is in’ (wide). And I want to remain true to
the scope Carroll used in his original argument;
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(ii) if we assume the negation takes wide scope, we might not look
further into Carroll’s argument. With the negation taking wide scope,
Carroll’s argument would be similar to McGee’s, which we’ve already
examined: Carroll’s second premise would have the form of the
negation of McGee’s conclusion and Carroll’s conclusion the form of
the negation of McGee’s second premise. If we didn’t look further into
Carroll’s argument, we’d miss out on the opportunity to make some
interesting findings about how different theories of the indicative
conditional grapple with negation – and I want not to miss out on that
opportunity; and
(iii) for some of the theories we’ll consider, namely the single-world
and suppositional ones, A ® ¬ B and ¬ (A ® B) are equivalent,
assuming A is possible or probable. So if we go ahead and formalise
the negation with wide scope, we’d be foreclosing the possibility of
considering a question under debate, namely ‘Is Carroll’s argument
equivalent to a modus tollens?’ – and I want not to foreclose that
possibility.
Carroll isn’t alone in offering a counterexample to modus tollens.
James Williams Forrester (1984), Frank Veltman (1985), John Cantwell
(2008), Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane (2010), and Seth Yalcin (2012)
do so too. I won’t discuss Veltman explicitly as the argument he presents
doesn’t raise any question I don’t answer in this chapter or the previous one.
Veltman’s argument is similar to Carroll’s inasmuch as one premise contains
an embedded conditional; and it’s similar to McGee’s inasmuch as there’s no
question about the scope of negation (Veltman’s negation takes wide scope
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(1985)). I’ll discuss Forrester (1984), Cantwell (2008), Kolodny and
MacFarlane (2010) and Yalcin (2012) in Chapter 4, as the arguments they
present contain – not embedded conditionals but – embedded modals.
Likewise, I’m not alone in offering a discussion of Carroll. Alfred
Sidgwick (1894), William Johnson (1894), Bertrand Russell (1905), Pavel
Florensky (1914/1997), Arthur Burks and Irving Copi (1950) and, more
recently, Michael Rhodes (2012) do so too. None of the initial respondents
had modern theories of indicative conditionals at their disposal; and Rhodes
focuses on comparing two of the earlier twentieth-century solutions rather
than discussing modern theories.
In this chapter, I consider Carroll’s argument in light of the material
(inspired by Grice (1961, 1975 and 1989)), possible-worlds (inspired by
Stalnaker (1981) and Lewis (1976)), suppositional (inspired by Adams (1975)
and Edgington (1995 and 2014)) and hybrid (inspired by Jackson (1987))
theories. Specifically, I examine how the theories respond to an inconsistent
triad of the following three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent
theses:
#1 the argument is invalid, i.e. it’s possible that the premises are true,
while the conclusion is false;
#2 the argument is equivalent to an instance of modus tollens, i.e. the
second premise of the argument is the contradictory of the consequent
of the first, and the conclusion is the contradictory of the antecedent or
since it’s plausible that A ® ¬ B is equivalent to ¬ (A ® B); and
#3 modus tollens is valid, i.e. any argument in which the second
premise is the contradictory of the consequent of the first and the
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conclusion is the contradictory of the antecedent of the first premise is
valid.
Of course and again, according to classical logic, #2 isn’t true. But part
of the challenge for the theories is to explain why it might be plausible. As
we’ll see, not all theories can explain the plausibility of all three theses at once
– and to solve the trilemma they must. Moreover, the theories which can
explain the plausibility of all three theses at once face problems of their own.
In section 1, I present the material theory and show that it rejects
Thesis #2 and can explain at most the plausibility of two theses. In section 2, I
present the possible-worlds theory and show that it rejects Thesis #1 but can’t
explain its plausibility. In section 3, I present the suppositional theory and
show that it rejects all theses and, like the material theorist when it comes to –
not the theses but – the total, can explain at most two theses. In section 4, I
present the hybrid theory and show that it rejects Thesis #2 and can explain its
plausibility. In section 5, I conclude.

1. The material theory
Recall that according to the material theorist, an indicative conditional Q ® R
is true if and only if the corresponding material conditional Q É R is true. In
other words, ‘If Q, then R’ is true if and only if Q is false or R is true. For
example, let Q be ‘Ben’s on sabbatical’ and R be ‘he’s in Australia’. The
indicative conditional ‘If Ben’s on sabbatical, then he’s in Australia’ is true if
and only if it’s not the case that Ben’s on sabbatical or it is the case that he’s
in Australia.
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Now, considering Carroll’s story, the material theorist might see the
following fact as the source of Uncle Jim’s puzzlement: among the viable
combinations of who might be in/out, it’s not necessarily the case that Carr is
in. Indeed, there are the following eight possible combinations = 23:

A

B

C

1

In

In

In

2

In

Out

In

3

Out

In

In

4

Out

Out

In

5

In

In

Out

6

In

Out

Out

7

Out

In

Out

8

Out

Out

Out

Table 3: Possible combinations for who, among the barbers, might be in/out

And among those eight, only five are viable in Carroll’s scenario. The second
premise rules out possible combinations #3 and #7. Each suggests that Allen is
out and Brown is in. Similarly, the first premise rules out possible
combination #8. It suggests that all barbers are out. And among the five viable
combinations, #5 and #6 have Carr out.
In this section, I show how the material theory can explain Thesis #3. I
also show how the theory must choose between explaining Theses #1 and #2.

1.1. Explaining Thesis #3: modus tollens is valid
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According to the material theory, Carroll’s argument doesn’t falsify Thesis #3.
There’s no question whether modus tollens is valid, i.e. where the premises of
an argument are those of a modus tollens and true, the conclusion will
necessarily also be true.
Suppose that both premises of a modus tollens argument are true. Then
the consequent of the first must be false. The second premise is true and the
contradictory of the first. But then, according to the material theory, the
antecedent of the first premise must be false. To be true, a conditional with a
false consequent must have a false antecedent. It follows that the conclusion
must be true, since the antecedent of the first premise is false and the
contradictory of the conclusion.
Carroll’s argument isn’t a counterexample to this. Its premises aren’t
those of a modus tollens (Russell, 1905). According to the material theory, the
premises have the form:
C É (A É B)
AÉ¬B
On the material account, the second premise A É ¬ B isn’t the contradictory of
the consequent of the first A É B. As we have seen, according to the account,
an indicative conditional Q ® R is true if and only if the corresponding
material conditional Q É R is true. And it isn’t the case that A É B is true if
and only if A É ¬ B is false. For example, where A is false, both conditionals
are true. With the second premise not being the contradictory of the
consequent of the first, Carroll’s argument doesn’t justify worries about modus
tollens not being truth-preserving, since it isn’t an instance of modus tollens.
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Moreover, it doesn’t justify worries about valid argument forms not
being truth-preserving either, since it’s not classically valid. The argument can
have true premises and a false conclusion. Just let A be false and C be true.
Here, the truth value of B doesn’t matter. Where C is true and A is false, the
first premise will be true. The main connective is a conditional which has a
true antecedent and true consequent. Where A is false, the second premise is
also true. The main connective is a conditional which has a false antecedent.
And where C is true, the conclusion is false. The main connective is a
negation whose argument is true.
Even if we avoid the scenario where the second premise seems to be
the contradictory of the consequent of the first, though logically it isn’t, the
material theorist faces problems. One way to avoid the scenario is to
reformulate the second premise such that it’s the logical contradictory of the
consequent of the first:
¬ (A É B)
Now, the new premise reads ‘It’s not the case that if Allen is out, then Brown
is in’ and ¬ (A É B) is much stronger an assertion than the original A É ¬ B
‘If Allen is out, then Brown is out’. According to the material theorist, the new
formulation is equivalent to A Ù ¬ B ‘Allen is out and Brown is out’ – a
conjunction rather than a conditional and one we wouldn’t accept. We don’t
know whether either conjunct is true, whether Allen or Brown is out
(Veltman, 1985, p. 26).

1.2. Distinguishing between truth and assertability
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So far, the material theory has a virtue: it explains the thesis according to
which the argument is invalid. The theory shows that the conclusion doesn’t
follow from the premises. The theory has a failing, however: it doesn’t explain
Thesis #2 according to which the second premise is the contradictory of the
consequent of the first. We take ‘If Allen is out, then Brown is out’ to deny ‘If
Allen is out, then it’s not the case that Brown is out’ yet the theory maintains
that the one doesn’t contradict the other (as we saw in passing in subsection
1.1.). Both conditionals can be true when it’s not the case that Allen is out.
Drawing on the concept of assertability we saw in Chapter 1, a
material theorist would argue that we take the second premise of Carroll’s
argument to be the contradictory of the consequent of the first not because
they can’t both be true – as we’ve seen, they can be – but rather because the
one is assertable if and only if we can deny the other. In normal
circumstances, again, saying both ‘If Allen is out, then Brown is out’, and also
‘If Allen is out, then it’s not the case that Brown is out’ wouldn’t be
reasonable. However, as we’ll see, in introducing the concept of assertability,
the material theorist faces a dilemma.

1.3. Framing the dilemma
Having introduced the concept of assertability, the material theorist now faces
a dilemma: show that A É ¬ B denies A É B or not. Either way, she can’t
explain Thesis #1 or Thesis #2.
Reformulating them in the relevant terms for the material theorist:
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Thesis #1: the argument doesn’t preserve assertability, i.e. while the
premises are such that we might assert them, the conclusion is such
that we wouldn’t.
Thesis #2: the second premise in Carroll’s argument denies the
consequent of the first. In other words, ‘If Allen is out, then Brown is
out’ denies ‘If Allen is out, then Brown is in’.
If the theorist can show that A É ¬ B denies A É B, then she can explain
Thesis #2 but not #1. And if she can’t show that A É ¬ B denies A É B, then
she can explain #1 but not #2. Let’s consider each horn in turn, taking the
second first.
Note, before we do, that the dilemma which the material theorist faces
here is different from that which the suppositional theorist faced in Chapter 2.
The suppositional theorist had to choose between explaining the plausibility of
– not #1 and #2, i.e. that the argument under consideration is invalid and it
has the form of a classically valid argument form but – #2 and #3, i.e. the
argument under consideration has the form of a classically valid argument
form and the classically valid argument is valid.

1.4. Trying to explain reformulated Thesis #2: the second premise denies the
consequent of the first
To explain Thesis #2, the material theorist would deny
(i) A É ¬ B is true if and only if A É B isn’t
and argue
(ii) we can assert A É ¬ B if and only if we can deny A É B
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claiming that the thesis supports (ii) and not (i). But there’s a difference
between the thesis the theorist wants to prove (ii) and, as we’ll see, the thesis
the theorist can prove (iii):
(iii) we can assert A É ¬ B only if we cannot assert A É B
The difference is twofold: she wants to prove a biconditional (if and only if,
i.e. that the one side is a necessary and sufficient condition for the other) but
can prove only a conditional (only if, i.e. that the one side is a necessary – but
not sufficient – condition for the other); and she wants to prove that if we can
assert A É ¬ B, then we can deny A É B but can prove only that we cannot
assert A É B.
To try to show that the thesis supports (ii) and not (i), the material
theorist could seek to prove that A É ¬ B and A É B are not co-assertable. The
proof relies on two maxims of conversation:
Assert the stronger rather than the weaker (Grice, 1961, p. 132); and
Don’t assert what you don’t believe (Grice, 1975, p. 46).
(See Chapter 1 (subsections 1.1.1. and 1.2.) for discussion of these maxims.)
Suppose A É ¬ B and A É B are co-assertable. This implies that we
believe both conditionals to be true. If we didn’t believe A É ¬ B and A É B to
be true, they wouldn’t be assertable. In saying them, we would be saying
something we didn’t believe to be true. This in turn implies that we believe A
to be false. If A were true, then according to the truth table of the material
conditional, one conditional would be false. But if we believe A to be false,
then neither conditional is assertable. In asserting the conditionals, we would
be asserting weaker sentences when we could be asserting a stronger one. We
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could assert ¬ A. It entails A É ¬ B and A É B but not vice versa. So we must
abandon our initial supposition that A É ¬ B and A É B can be co-assertable.
This proof doesn’t help the theory. The proof shows that the second
premise isn’t assertable when the consequent of the first one is and vice versa
(iii). It doesn’t show, however, that the second premise denies the consequent
of the first and vice versa – and to explain Thesis #2 it must. From the fact
that, when we assert the second premise, we can’t assert the consequent of the
first it doesn’t follow that, when we assert the second premise, we can deny
the consequent of the first. (Here, I understand ‘denying p’ as being equal to
‘asserting not-p’.) Just because, not knowing where Mike is, I can’t assert
‘Mike is in the USA’ doesn’t mean I can deny ‘Mike is in the USA’. He might
very well be there, I don’t know!
Here, to explain Thesis #2, the material theorist must be able to show
that when we can assert the second premise, we can deny the consequent of
the first. Showing that the two aren’t co-assertable is not sufficient. In other
words, the proof shows something weaker than we want here. It shows (iii)
rather than (ii).
While showing (iii) if not (ii) gives the material theorist a partial
solution, one needn’t think she’s in better a position than other theorists.
While the material theorist might receive a pass here, she’d receive a fail
elsewhere. Recall that, in the previous chapter, the material theorist found
unassertable a sentence we might assert.

1.5. Trying to explain reformulated Thesis #1: the argument doesn’t preserve
assertability
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Moreover, a successful explanation of Thesis #2 would bar the material
theorist from explaining Thesis #1, according to which the conclusion is such
that we wouldn’t assert it. Given that the material theorist has explained
Thesis #2, and shown that the second premise denies the consequent of the
first, the following two principles of assertability would commit the material
theorist to saying that the conclusion must also be assertable:
Principle #1
If we can assert a conditional and deny its consequent, then we must be
able to deny its antecedent.
Principle #2
We can deny a statement if and only if its negation is assertable.
Briefly on Principle #1 – assuming the material theorist accepts modus
tollens and wants to have a surrogate for Thesis #3, she will accept Principle
#1. It’s just a reformulation of modus tollens in terms of assertability rather
than validity. Granted, the material theorist wouldn’t say that every argument
which is valid preserves assertability. One of the paradoxes of material
implication – Q; Therefore, if R, then Q – is a counterexample. But it doesn’t
follow that the material theorist would say that modus tollens doesn’t preserve
assertability. Modus tollens is different from the paradoxical argument. The
paradox is (materially) valid but seems invalid. In contrast, modus tollens is
(materially) valid and seems valid.
Now if, as we have seen, we can assert C É (A É B) and can deny A É
B, then, by Principle #1, we will be able to deny C. And if we can deny C,
then, by Principle #2, we will be able to assert ¬ C. ¬ C will be assertable –
despite the thesis that it isn’t.
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Note that the principles aren’t controversial. For example, if we can
assert ‘If Elena isn’t in the Grad Room, then she’s at the library’ and can deny
that she’s at the library, then we can deny that she isn’t in the Grad Room
(Principle #1). Furthermore, if we can deny that she isn’t in the Grad Room,
then we can assert ‘Elena’s in the Grad Room’ (Principle #2).
Now, the material theorist can explain the thesis that the conclusion
isn’t assertable and avoid undermining the main tenet by abandoning the claim
that A É ¬ B denies A É B. By doing so, she allows a scenario where we can
assert A É ¬ B and C É (A É B) without having to deny C. While we can’t
assert A É B in this scenario, it doesn’t follow from the fact that we can’t
assert A É B that we can deny it, and so Principle #1 need not apply.
This doesn’t, however, help the theory either. Granted, it enables the
material theorist to explain Thesis #1. However, obviously, in abandoning the
explanation that A É ¬ B denies A É B, the theorist can no longer even begin
to explain Thesis #2.

1.6. Making Carroll’s argument classically valid
Even if we avoid the scenario where the second premise fails logically to
contradict the consequent of the first, the material theorist faces problems. One
way to avoid the scenario is to reformulate the second premise such that it’s
the logical contradictory of the consequent of the first:
¬ (A É B)
Now, the new premise reads ‘It’s not the case that if Allen is out, then Brown
is in’ and ¬ (A É B) is much stronger an assertion than the original A É ¬ B
‘If Allen is out, then Brown is out’. According to the material theorist, the new
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formulation is equivalent to A Ù ¬ B ‘Allen is out and Brown is out’ – a
conjunction rather than a conditional and one we wouldn’t accept. We don’t
know whether either conjunct is true, whether Allen or Brown is out.
Here, the material theorist might claim that it’s not always clear what a
speaker who says ‘It’s not the case that if Q, then R’ is committing himself to
or intends to convey (Grice, 1989, pp. 80-1). She could be saying that it’s not
the case that ‘If Q, then R’ is true, or that it’s not the case that it’s assertable.
According to Grice, there are three kinds of cases but, as we will see, only two
are relevant to Carroll’s example:
‘(1) Cases in which the unnegated conditional [‘If Q, then R’] has
(would have) no [meaning beyond its literal meaning], and in which the total
signification of its utterance is representable by the content of the material
conditional’ (Grice, 1989, p. 80). In other words, the denial of ‘If Q, then R’
has the meaning of denying the literal content of ‘If Q, then R’, in other words,
of asserting ‘Q and not-R’.
This interpretation isn’t relevant. According to it, the second premise is
equivalent to ‘Allen is out and Brown is out’ which we have already rejected
as too strong; next
(2) cases where the denial of ‘If Q, then R’ ‘is naturally taken as a way
of propounding a counterconditional, the consequent of which is the negation
of the consequent of the original conditional’: ‘If Q, then not-R’ (Grice, 1989,
p. 80).
This interpretation is relevant. According to it, ¬ (A É B) has the
meaning of the counterconditional A É ¬ B, which is the original formulation.
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However, this just brings us back to the original problem of explaining
Thesis #2: we would be trying to explain why A É ¬ B denies A É B despite
the fact that, according to their truth tables, the two conditionals can be true
when A is false; and finally
(3) cases where the denial of ‘If Q, then R’ ‘has the effect of a refusal
to assert the conditional in question, characteristically because the denier does
not think that there are adequate non-truth-functional grounds for such an
assertion’ (Grice, 1989, p. 81).
Let’s consider this more closely. A truth-functional ground for
asserting ‘If Q, then R’ would be that you know R or you know not-Q. So if
you know that Amelia is in the USA, you have a truth-functional ground for
asserting ‘If she’s not in Morocco, then she’s in the USA’. Likewise, if you
know that Amelia is in Morocco, you have a truth-functional ground for
asserting ‘If she’s not in Morocco, then she’s in the USA’.
A non-truth functional ground for asserting ‘If Q, then R’, then, would
be that you know ‘Either R or not-Q’ but you don’t know R and you don’t
know not-Q either. So if you know that either Amelia is in the USA or she’s in
Morocco but you don’t know that currently she’s in the USA and you don’t
know that currently she’s in Morocco, you have a non-truth functional ground
for asserting ‘If she’s not in Morocco, then she’s in the USA’.
Now, a person might not have adequate non-truth functional grounds
to assert ‘If Q, then R’ for a couple reasons: she has a reason but it’s a truthfunctional one; or she has no reason whatsoever to assert the conditional in the
first place. So if you know only that Amelia is in the USA, you do not have an
adequate non-truth functional ground to assert ‘If she’s not in Morocco, then
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she’s in the USA’. Same if you know only that Amelia is in Morocco. In those
two cases, you know only a truth-functional ground for asserting the
conditional: you know the consequent is true; or you know the antecedent is
false.
And you also lack a non-truth functional ground to assert the
conditional should Amelia be standing in front of you in Singapore. In that
case, you have no reason to assert the conditional in the first place. You have
no reason to think that Amelia is either in Morocco or the USA.
Like the second, this third interpretation is relevant. According to it, ¬
(A É B) is a refusal to assert A É B. Here, we would refuse to assert ‘If Allen
is out, then Brown is in’ not because we have a truth-functional ground to
assert it. It’s not that we know that it’s not the case that Allen is out or that we
know that Brown is in. On our way to the barbershop, we have no idea who
we’ll find there. Rather, it’s that we have no reason to assert the conditional in
the first place.
Note that here I’m not saying ‘There’s no reason to assert anything’.
That would be false because we do have a reason to assert ‘If A, then not-B’.
Indeed, through the story, we know Allen never goes out alone and always
takes Brown. But the fact that we have this reason is irrelevant. It’s relevant
only when we’re talking about asserting ‘If A, then not-B’ and above we’re
talking about asserting ‘If A, then B’ – a conditional with the same antecedent
A but a negation before the consequent B. No, instead of saying ‘There’s no
reason to assert anything’, I’m saying ‘There’s no reason to assert “If A, then
B”’ and that’s true.

88

Alas, the material theorist is now back in the position of being unable
to explain Thesis #2. Her problem was A É ¬ B didn’t deny A É B. One
solution was to change A É ¬ B such that it explicitly denied A É B, in other
words, change A É ¬ B to ¬ (A É B). But since it turns out this explicit denial
is really just a refusal to assert A É ¬ B, we are back at square one, in the
position of having A É ¬ B not denying A É B – and being unable to explain
Thesis #2.

2. The possible-worlds theory
Recall that according to the possible-worlds theorist, an indicative conditional
‘If Q, then R’ is true in a possible world w if and only if R is true in all the Qworlds which are most similar to w (and vacuously true when there’s no Qworld) (Stalnaker, 1981, pp. 46-7; see also Lewis, 1973).
A Q-world is one in which the antecedent Q is true. For example, the
conditional ‘If Nicholas is at the office, then he’s in London’ is true in the
actual world just in case Nicholas is in London in all most-similar worlds in
which Nicholas is at the office.
As we saw in Chapter 1, possible-worlds theorists disagree on the
number of most-similar antecedent-worlds to any given possible world. Some
such as Stalnaker (1981) hold that there can be only one (p. 46). We’re calling
them the single-world theorists. Others such as Lewis (1973) hold that there
can be more than one (pp. 97-8). We’re calling them the multiple-world
theorists. (Remember that since Lewis’s theory is about counterfactual
conditionals and here we are looking at indicative ones, the multiple-world
theorist is an imagined version of Lewis.)
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In this section, I show how both possible-worlds theories can, like the
material theory, explain Thesis #3. I also show how, while the single-world
theorist can explain #2 but not #1, the multiple-world theorist can explain
neither.

2.1. Accepting Thesis #3: modus tollens is valid
Carroll’s argument doesn’t falsify Thesis #3. There’s no question whether
modus tollens is truth-preserving, i.e. where the premises of an argument are
those of a modus tollens and true, the conclusion will also be true.
Suppose that both premises of a modus tollens argument are true. This
means that in the most-similar worlds in which the antecedent of the first
premise is true, the consequent of the first premise is also true. Likewise, in
the most-similar antecedent worlds in which the antecedent of the second
premise is true, the consequent of the second premise is also true. But since
the second premise is the contradictory of the consequent of the first, the
antecedent of the first premise can’t be true in the actual world. We assumed
that the first premise is true in the actual world and we see that it has a false
consequent there. It follows that the conclusion is true. The conclusion is the
contradictory of the antecedent of the first premise and the antecedent of the
first premise is false.

2.2. Facing trouble with the single-world theory
The single-world theory can explain Thesis #2 but not Thesis #1. On this
theory, as long as A is possible (i.e. there exists a world in which A is true), A
® ¬ B is the contradictory of A ® B; in other words, A ® ¬ B and ¬ (A ® B)
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are equivalent; in yet other words, the principle of Conditional Excluded
Middle, which we saw in Chapter 1 (subsection 2.1.) and according to which
(A ® B) Ú (A ® ¬ B) is a tautology, is true. The proof is as follows:
First, assuming A is possible, A ® ¬ B implies ¬ (A ® B). For A ® ¬
B to be true, it must be the case that, in the nearest antecedent-world (and there
will only be one), B is false. It follows that ¬ (A ® B) is true, since for ¬ (A
® B) to be true, it must be the case that A ® B is false, and for A ® B to be
false, it must be the case that, in the nearest antecedent-world, B is false – and,
as we have seen, B is indeed false in that world.
And second, ¬ (A ® B) implies A ® ¬ B. For ¬ (A ® B) to be true, it
must be the case that A ® B is false. For A ® B to be false, it must be the case
that, in the nearest antecedent-world, B is false, and so ¬ B is true. It follows
that A ® ¬ B is true, since in the nearest antecedent-world, A is, of course,
true, and, as we have seen, in that world, ¬ B is true.
So the theory can account for Thesis #2. It can’t do the same for Thesis
#1. According to the theory, the argument is valid. For suppose the argument
is invalid (i.e. suppose the premises are true and the conclusion false in the
actual world). Then in the actual world, C is true. Since the actual world is a
most-similar antecedent-world to itself in which C is true, it follows that A ®
B is true there. Now, suppose v is a most-similar antecedent-world to the
actual world in which A is true (so long as A is possible, we can make this
assumption). Since A ® ¬ B is true in the actual world, ¬ B is true in v. But
since A ® B is also true in the actual world, B is true in v. So we have both B
and ¬ B in v, which is a contradiction. On this theory, the argument must be
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valid and can’t account for the thesis that we might assert the premises but we
wouldn’t assert the conclusion.

2.3. Facing trouble with the multiple-world theory
While holding that there can be only one most-similar antecedent-world yields
bad results, holding that there can be more than one such world yields even
worse ones. The multiple-world theory can’t explain either Thesis #1 or
Thesis #2. With the principle that there can be more than one most-similar
antecedent-world, the second premise isn’t the contradictory of the consequent
of the first. Indeed, the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle isn’t true. A
® B and A ® ¬ B could both be false at the same time. When trying to
evaluate the truth value of A ® B in the actual world, we look for the mostsimilar A-worlds. Among them, we might find two equally-similar worlds
where B is true in one and false in the other. If that is the case, then we have a
scenario where A ® ¬ B and A ® B are both false.
And here too, the argument is valid, so the multiple-world theory can’t
explain Thesis #1 either. The proof of validity we saw in the context of the
single-world theory is applicable here. No step in it relied on there being no
more than one antecedent-world. Moreover, in rejecting one premise – or even
accepting the conclusion – the possible-worlds theorist would be abandoning
any attempt at explaining Thesis #1.
We see that neither kind of possible-worlds theories can explain all
three theses. One way forward might be to abandon the concept of possible
worlds and truth. The suppositional theory does both. Let’s turn to it now.
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3. The suppositional theory
Recall that according to suppositional theorists such as Adams (1975) and
Edgington (1995 and 2014) the Equation holds true: writing ‘P’ for
probability,
P(Q ® R) = P(R | Q) provided that P(Q) ≠ 0.
In prose, the probability of a conditional Q ® R is equal to the conditional
probability of the consequent R, on the supposition that the antecedent Q is
true so long as the probability of Q isn’t equal to zero.
So, according to the Equation, the probability of the conditional ‘If Josie’s at
home, then she’s in New York’ is equal to the conditional probability of
‘Josie’s in New York’ given ‘she’s at home’.
The Equation implies that a conditional is non-propositional. If a
conditional were propositional, then for any conditional there would be a
proposition whose probability were equal to the conditional probability of its
consequent given its antecedent. But there isn’t (Lewis, 1976). The two
propositions don’t combine into a single proposition we judge as probably true
when we judge the second to be probably true on the supposition of the first
(Edgington, 1995, p. 305).
So, according to the suppositional theory it’s not the case that ‘If
Josie’s at home, then she’s in New York’ can be true or false. As we’ll see,
this framework allows the suppositional theorist to explain the plausibility of
all three theses.

3.1. Rejecting Thesis #2: the argument is equivalent to an instance of modus
tollens
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The suppositional theorist rejects #2 on the grounds that the thesis requires
that conditionals be propositional. As we’ve seen, she takes conditionals to be
non-propositional. For the second premise and consequent of the first to be
logical contradictories, when one is true, the other must be false – and
conditionals aren’t true or false. This being so, according to her, Carroll’s
argument is no closer to being equivalent to an instance of modus tollens than
the following one in which the second premise is an imperative:
If it’s sunny, then do go outside!
Don’t go outside!
Therefore, it’s not the case that it’s sunny.
Here, as in Carroll’s argument, the second premise – ‘Don’t go outside!’ – is
non-propositional and can’t be the logical contradictory of the consequent of
the first premise. Since, to accept #2, the suppositional theorist must find the
second premise in Carroll’s argument propositional and she doesn’t, the
theorist doesn’t accept #2.
Now, according to her account, the second premise A ® ¬ B and the
consequent of the first A ® B are – if not logically, then – probabilistically
contradictory. We define two formulae as probabilistically contradictory
where necessarily the sum of their probabilities is equal to one and
the probability of the conjunction is zero. Formally, for any formulae Q and R,
Q and R are probabilistically inconsistent if and only if necessarily P(Q) = 1 P(R) and P(Q Ù R) = 0. In Carroll’s argument ‘If Allen is out, then Brown is
out’ and ‘If Allen is out, then it’s not the case that Brown is out’ are
probabilistically contradictory, since P(A ® ¬ B) = 1 - P(A ® B) and P((A ®
¬ B) Ù (A ® B)) = 0 provided that P(A) isn’t zero. Because of this, we can’t

94

resolve the trilemma by pointing out that A ® ¬ B and A ® B are not
contradictory – probabilistically, they are (Adams, 1975, p. 42).
To derive a proof, the suppositional theorist would rely on the
Conditional Contradiction and the Equation. Recall the lemma we proved in
Chapter 2 (subsection 3.2.) showing that, assuming the probability of Q isn’t
zero, the probability of not-R given Q is one minus the probability of R given
Q. Now, here’s how the suppositional theorist would prove that the second
premise and the consequent of the first are probabilistically contradictory,
provided that P(A) isn’t zero:
1. P(B | A) = 1 - P(¬ B | A)

by Conditional Contradiction

2. P(A ® B) = 1 - P(A ® ¬ B)

from 1 by the Equation

That said, whether the suppositional theorist can say that – beyond the second
premise and consequent of the first being probabilistically contradictory – the
argument is equivalent to an instance of modus tollens depends on her
definition of modus tollens. She can define it in two ways: one more-inclusive,
another less-inclusive.
According to each definition, of course, the argument will have two
premises and a conclusion; the second premise and antecedent of the first will
be contradictories; likewise the conclusion and the antecedent of the first
premise. Differentiating the more- and less-inclusive definitions, however, is
whether the second premise and consequent of the first (and, albeit less
relevant here, the conclusion and antecedent of the first premise) must be
propositional. According to the more-inclusive definition, it’s not the case that
they must.
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If she adopts the more-inclusive definition, then she can say that
Carroll’s argument is probabilistically equivalent to a modus tollens. Indeed,
this definition includes instances of complex modus tollens, arguments such as
Carroll’s with an embedded conditional. If she adopts the less-inclusive
definition, then she can’t say that Carroll’s argument is probabilistically
equivalent to a modus tollens. Indeed, this definition includes only instances of
simple modus tollens, arguments without an embedded conditional or
imperative.
Granted, considering #2, the one definition might appear more
attractive to us than the other inasmuch as the more-inclusive definition allows
the suppositional theorist to explain the plausibility of the thesis and the lessinclusive one doesn’t. However, as we’ll see when considering #3, the
opposite will be true: the less-inclusive definition might appear more attractive
than the more-inclusive one.

3.2. Rejecting Thesis #1: the argument is invalid
The suppositional theorist would deny that the argument is invalid – i.e. deny
that it’s possible for the premises of the argument to be true, while the
conclusion is false – on the grounds that it’s impossible for the premises to be
true at all. Instead, she’d argue that the argument is probabilistically invalid –
i.e. it’s possible for the premises to be probable (say, have a probability over
0.5), while the conclusion is improbable (say, have a probability under 0.5)
(Adams, 1975, p. 1)). She would defend the surrogate thesis over the original
one, claiming that conditionals don’t have truth values but probabilities.
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To prove that the argument is probabilistically invalid, we show that
it’s not the case that the uncertainty of the conclusion can’t exceed the sum of
the uncertainties of the premises. And to calculate the uncertainties, first we
calculate the probabilities of the premises and the conclusion.
Suppose (i) P(C) is very high; (ii) P(¬ B Ù C) is zero; and (iii) P(¬ B |
A) is very high (as illustrated in Figure 1). From (iii) and the Equation, it
follows that the probability of the second premise is high. (The area
representing the probability of ¬ B takes up a large proportion of the area
representing the probability of A). From (ii), it follows that P(C Ù A Ù ¬ B) ÷
P(C Ù A) is zero. From this and the Ratio Formula, it follows that P(¬ B | (C Ù
A)) is zero. From this and the Equation it follows that P((C Ù A) ® ¬ B) is
zero. And from this and the result in the last subsection about probabilistically
contradictory conditionals, it follows that the probability of the first premise is
one. (The intersection of the areas representing the probabilities of A and C is
entirely covered by the area representing the probability of B.) Finally, from
(i) it follows that P(¬ C) is very low.
Translating probability into uncertainty, we see that the uncertainty of
the conclusion can exceed the sum of the uncertainties of the premises. The
sum of the uncertainties of the premises is close to zero: as the probability of
the first premise is one, the uncertainty of the first premise is zero; and, as the
probability of the second premise is close to one, the uncertainty of the second
premise is close to zero. However, as the probability of the conclusion is itself
very close to zero, the uncertainty of the conclusion is very close to one –
exceeding the sum of the uncertainties of the premises.
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Figure 2: Venn diagram of the Barbershop Paradox

As we see, the argument is probabilistically invalid. In other words, we
can be justified in accepting that ‘If Carr is out, then if Allen is out, then it’s
not the case that Brown is out’ and ‘If Allen is out, then Brown is out’ while
rejecting ‘It’s not the case that Carr is out’.

3.3. Rejecting Thesis #3: modus tollens is valid
Depending on how she defines modus tollens, the argument form is or isn’t
probabilistically valid according to the suppositional theorist. If she defines it
as being equivalent to simple modus tollens, then it’s probabilistically valid. If
she defines it as being equivalent to complex modus tollens, then it isn’t.
To prove the probabilistic invaliditiy of complex modus tollens, the
theorist could refer to the counterexample we saw in the previous subsection
(3.2).
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To prove the probabilistic validity of simple modus tollens, she’d need
to prove that for any argument with the form Q ® R; ¬ R; \ ¬ Q where we
replace Q and R with propositions, it’s not the case the uncertainty of the
conclusion can be greater than the sum of the uncertainties of the premises.
And she can do that by drawing on the proof she derived in Chapter 2
(subsection 3.2) showing that simple modus ponens was probabilistically
valid:
1. U(¬ R) + U(Q É R) ³ U(¬ Q)
because ¬ R and Q É R entail ¬ Q
2. U(Q É R) ³ U(¬ Q) - U(¬ R)
from 1 by algebra
3. U(Q ® R) ³ U(¬ Q) - U(¬ R)
from 2 and the fact that an indicative conditional
probabilistically entails a material one (see line
10 of proof in Chapter 2 (subsection 3.2.)) by
algebra
4. U(Q ® R) + U(¬ R) ³ U(¬ Q)
from 3 by algebra
And she would have proved what she wanted. Line 4 says that simple modus
tollens is probabilistically valid for the indicative conditional according to the
suppositional theorist.
So just as she did while responding to the trilemma giving rise to the
Election Paradox, the suppositional theorist faces a dilemma: explain the
thesis according to which the argument is equivalent to an instance of a
classically valid argument form; or explain the thesis according to which that
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classically valid argument form is valid. Just as before in the case of modus
ponens, the definition of modus tollens she adopts will allow her to explain
either #2 or #3 – but not both. Adopting the more-inclusive definition, she can
explain #2 but not #3. Adopting the less-inclusive definition, she can explain
#3 but not #2.
In the following section, we turn to a theory which agrees with the
suppositional one on our being prepared to assert a conditional where we find
it has a high probability but disagrees with it on conditionals being nonpropositional. In so doing, the hybrid theory succeeds in explaining the theses
without facing the problems the suppositional theory does when it comes to
the truth-conditional theory of meaning.

4. The hybrid theory
The hybrid theory combines elements from the material theory and the
suppositional theory. On the one hand, like the material theory, the hybrid one
concerns itself with truth. On the other hand, like the suppositional theory, the
hybrid one concerns itself with probability. For example, an indicative
conditional is true where the corresponding material one is; it’s assertible
where the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is
high. Recall, the material theory’s concept of assertability with an ‘a’ and the
hybrid theory’s concept of assertibility with an ‘i’ aren’t the same.
The hybrid theorist can explain all three theses.

4.1. Accepting Thesis #1: the argument is invalid
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The hybrid theorist accepts that valid arguments might not preserve
assertibility: ‘I hope I have already accustomed you to the idea that a valid
inference

may

lead

from

the

highly

assertible

to

the

highly

unassertible’ (Jackson, 1987, p. 133). To explain Thesis #1, however, the
hybrid theorist must show that an invalid argument isn’t assertibilitypreserving.
Some invalid arguments are assertibility-preserving. The following is a
case in point:
Alley is good at mathematics but not at chess.
Therefore, being good at mathematics contrasts with not being good at
chess.
Here, the argument preserves assertibility but not truth. If we are prepared to
assert the premise, then we’ll be prepared to assert the conclusion. The ‘but’ in
the premise conversationally implies the contrast which the conclusion
mentions. However, if the premise is true, it’s not necessarily the case that the
conclusion will also be true.
Now, the theory can explain Thesis #1. As we’ve already seen, just as
the argument doesn’t preserve probability, according to the suppositional
theory, it doesn’t preserve assertibility, according to the hybrid one. As we
saw in the previous chapter, the assertibility of Q ® (R ® S) is exactly the
same as that of the corresponding sentence of the form (Q Ù R) ® S (Jackson
1987, p. 130). According to the hybrid theory, Import-Export preserves not
only truth but also assertibility. Moreover, it’s possible for the premises (C Ù
A) ® B and A ® ¬ B to be highly assertible while the conclusion ¬ C isn’t.
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Applying Adams’ Thesis to the suppositional theory’s proof of probabilistic
invalidity shows this.

4.2. Rejecting Thesis #2: the argument is equivalent to an instance of modus
tollens
The theory can also explain the plausibility of Thesis #2. Granted, according
to the hybrid theory, they aren’t logically contradictory. It’s not the case that A
® ¬ B is true if and only if A ® B is false. The conditionals can both be true
when A is false. However, just as the suppositional theorist could show that
the probability of the first was 1 minus the probability of the second, the
hybrid theorist can show that the assertibility of the first is 1 minus the
assertibility of the other (and vice versa).
Just as the probability of A ® B was 1 minus the probability of A ® ¬
B, the assertibility of A ® B is 1 minus the assertibility of A ® ¬ B. The
hybrid theorist’s proof proceeds the same way as the suppositional theorist’s
up to line 6 before diverging. Line 7 follows from line 6 by – not the Equation
but – Adams’ Thesis. According to Adams’ Thesis, the assertibility of ‘If Q,
then R’ is the conditional probability of R given Q. So, the assertibility of the
conditional ‘If it’s raining, then it’s cloudy’ is equal to the conditional
probability of ‘it’s cloudy’ given ‘it’s raining’.
This proof is sufficient to explain the thesis. Indeed, it goes beyond the
material theory in saying not only that A ® ¬ B and A ® B aren’t coassertible. On the material theory, if we can assert the one, then we can’t assert
the other – but this doesn’t mean that we can go so far as to deny the other. In
contrast, on the hybrid theory, if we can assert A ® ¬ B, then we can deny A
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® B and vice versa. As Jackson writes, the two conditionals ‘have a kind of
“see-saw” relationship. As the assertibility of one goes up, the assertibility of
the other goes down’ (Jackson, 1987, pp. 12-3).

4.3. Accepting Thesis #3: modus tollens is valid
Moreover, the theory can explain Thesis #3, according to which modus tollens
is valid. Carroll’s argument doesn’t falsify the claim that modus tollens
preserves truth. Like the material theorist, the hybrid one would point out that
the argument doesn’t strictly have the form of a modus tollens. The second
premise isn’t the logical contradictory of the consequent of the first.
Note that the hybrid theorist’s explanation is different from the
suppositional theorist’s. The hybrid theorist isn’t saying that the second
premise isn’t the logical contradictory of the consequent of the first because
the second premise is non-propositional. Rather, the hybrid theorist is saying
that the second premise and the consequent of the first can both be true when
A is false.
That said, Carroll’s argument falsifies the claim that modus tollens
preserves assertibility. When we reformulate the premises and conclusion such
that they have the relevant logical form, namely
C ® (A ® B)
¬ (A ® B)
\¬C
the first premise is assertible, so too is the second – ‘It’s not the case that if
Allen is out, then Brown is in’ – but still the conclusion isn’t. Despite it being
assertible, we might nonetheless reject the second premise in its new
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formulation. ¬ (A ® B) is logically equivalent to A Ù ¬ B – ‘Allen is out and
it’s not the case that Brown is in’ – and on our way to the barbershop, we are
agnostic about the current whereabouts of Allen and Brown.

5. Concluding
In this chapter, I proceeded largely from first principles in analysing Lewis
Carroll’s alleged counterexample to modus tollens. I focused on the responses
four theories of the indicative conditional would offer to the trilemma
Carroll’s argument presents. According to the material theory, (i) Carroll’s
argument is logically invalid and doesn’t preserve assertability (with an ‘a’);
(ii) the second premise isn’t the logical contradictory of the consequent of the
first and, while the theory falls short of showing that if you can assert the one,
then you can deny the other, the theory can show that the two are not coassertable; and (iii) modus tollens is logically valid and preserves assertability.
According to the single-world theory, (i) Carroll’s argument is
logically valid; (ii) the second premise is the logical contradictory of the
consequent of the first; and (iii) modus tollens is logically valid. The multiworld theorist agrees when it comes to (i) and (iii) but disagrees when it
comes to (ii). According to her, the second premise isn’t the logical
contradictory of the consequent of the first.
According to the suppositional theory, (i) Carroll’s argument is
probabilistically invalid; (ii) while the second premise and consequent of the
first aren’t logical contradictories, they are probabilistic ones; and (iii) whether
modus tollens is probabilistically valid or Carroll’s argument is an instance of
modus tollens depends on her definition of the argument form: if it extends to
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include Carroll’s argument, then modus tollens isn’t probabilistically valid
while if it doesn’t extend to include his argument, then modus tollens is
probabilistically valid.
Finally, according to the hybrid theory, (i) Carroll’s argument is
logically invalid and doesn’t preserve assertibility (with an ‘i’); (ii) the second
premise and consequent of the first aren’t logical contradictories but the
assertibility of the one is high if and only if the assertibility of the other is low;
and (iii) modus tollens preserves truth if not assertibility.
Carroll ends his ‘ornamental presentment’ with the young Cub saying:
‘How long this argument might have lasted, I haven’t the least idea. I believe
either of [Uncle Jim or Uncle Joe] could argue for six hours at a stretch. But,
just at this moment we arrived at the barber’s shop; and, on going inside, we
found – ’ (Carroll, 1894, p. 437).
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CHAPTER 4
ON PREMISE SEMANTICS AND APPARENT COUNTEREXAMPLES TO
MODUS PONENS AND MODUS TOLLENS

This chapter is about premise semantics for the indicative conditional and
apparent counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens. Specifically,
it’s about how a theory designed to account for conditionals with embedded
modals deals with instances of the two classically valid argument forms where
a premise is a conditional with an embedded modal.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. In section 1, I offer an exegesis of
premise semantics (drawing on Kratzer (2012)). In section 2, I argue that,
when it comes to counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens with
(overt) modal verbs and adverbs, the theory gives us some results we want
(e.g. invalidating Kolodny and MacFarlane’s Miners examples (2010)) and
others we don’t (e.g. validating Cantwell’s Lottery (2008)) – a point which the
literature previously overlooked. In section 3, I analyse the Election and
Barbershop paradoxes through the lens of premise semantics. And in section
4, I conclude.

1. Exegesis
According to this theory, conditionals are modal restrictors, so we’re going to
talk now about modal semantics. In the possible-worlds semantics we are
building here, we identify propositions with sets of possible worlds. Indeed, a
proposition p is true in a possible world w in the set of possible worlds W if
and only if w is an element of p. Formally,
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A proposition p is true in w Î W if and only if w Î p. 8
A conversational background is a function from worlds to premise sets – or
sets of propositions (Kratzer, 2012, p. 20). A conversational background can
be realistic, totally realistic or empty.

Realistic
A realistic conversational background is a function f such that for any
world w Î W, w Î Ç f(w). That is, f assigns to every possible world a
set of propositions that are true in it (Kratzer, 2012, p. 32).
Totally realistic
A totally realistic conversational background is a function f such that
for any w Î W, w Î Ç f(w) = {w}. That is, f assigns to any world a set
of propositions that characterises it uniquely. For each world, there are
many ways of characterizing it uniquely (Kratzer, 2012, p. 33).
Empty
The empty conversational background is a function f such that for any
w Î W, f(w) = Æ. Since Ç f(w) = W if f(w) = Æ, empty conversational
backgrounds are also realistic (Kratzer, 2012, p. 33).
We can think of conversational backgrounds in terms of not only premise sets
8

In this chapter, I’m using lowercase letters (such as p) to denote sets of
possible worlds, which we call propositions. In previous chapters, I was using
uppercase letters (such as A, B, C) to denote truth-apt sentences. (The
exception being where the suppositional theorist takes e.g. R to denote an
indicative conditional. Of course, conditionals aren’t truth-apt according to
her.) So the use here of lowercase letters following the use before of uppercase
ones represents a change in – not notation but – subject.
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but also the kinds of witnesses in a criminal trial. For example, a
conversational background containing only premises we know is realistic: if
we know the premises, then they’re true. The witness corresponding to the
realistic background is one who tells the truth (albeit not the whole truth: there
are premises we don’t know).
Next, a conversational background containing enough premises to
single out the actual world is totally realistic. The witness corresponding to the
totally realistic background is one who tells the whole truth and nothing but
the truth.
And finally, a conversational background containing as premises the
laws of an anarchic society is empty: an anarchic society has no laws. The
witness corresponding with the empty background is one who remains silent.
And, when analysing conditionals, we consider two kinds of
conversational backgrounds: a modal base and an ordering source. Let’s
define each in turn.

Modal base
Phrases such as ‘in view of what we know’ identify a modal base (Von Fintel
and Heim, 2011, 41). Our knowledge differs from one possible world to
another. In one possible world, I might know that Mongolia has a capital city
but not know its name. In another possible world, I might know that Mongolia
has a capital and that the name of the capital city of Mongolia is Ulaanbaatar.
In each world, what we know consists of a set of propositions. So in
our example, in the first possible world, the set includes the proposition (1)
where
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(1) Mongolia has a capital city.
In the second, the set includes the propositions (1) and (2) where
(2) The name of the capital city of Mongolia is Ulaanbaatar.
The modal base then is that function which assigns to every possible world the
set of propositions we know in that world.
Returning to our definition of truth in a world, we identify (2) with the
set of possible worlds where (2) is true. So ‘The name of the capital city of
Mongolia is Ulaanbaatar’ is false in the first world but true in the second. The
first world isn’t an element of the proposition. The second one is.
Having identified propositions with sets of possible worlds, we can get
the set of worlds in which all the propositions in a set are true. For example,
we can identify the worlds which are compatible with everything we know. To
define compatibility formally,
A proposition p is compatible with a set of propositions A if and only if
A È {p} is consistent (Kratzer, 2012, p. 10).
Returning to our example once more and assuming that (1) is the only thing
we know in the first world, what we know in the first world is compatible with
the second world. (1) is compatible with the set containing (1) and (2).
The modal base might not always be explicit. Consider
(3) (In view of what we know,) Mongolia has a capital city.
While the ‘in view of’-phrase explicitly signals the intended modal base, we
can still infer the epistemic base which the speaker assumes, should she omit
the phrase. Other clues in the discourse might help us here (Von Fintel and
Heim, 2011, p. 41).
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Ordering source (from Von Fintel and Heim, 2011, pp. 59-61)
An ordering source is a kind of conversational background – and as such, it’s a
function from possible worlds to premise sets. This kind of conversational
background ranks ‘worlds according to how close they come to the normal
course of events in the world of evaluation, given a suitable normalcy
standard’ (Kratzer, 2012, p. 39). In other words, a set of propositions A can
induce an ordering £A on a set of possible worlds W such that a possible world
w is at least as close as a possible world z to the ideal A determines if and only
if all propositions of A that are true in z are true in w as well (Kratzer, 2012,
pp. 39-40).
One reason we need a second conversational background is to provide
for deontic cases. Consider the proposition
(4) Amarbold must pay a fine.
The truth of such a proposition depends both on facts about the law and facts
about Amarbold’s actions. For example, we’ll judge (4) as true if (i) the law
states that bringing durian on a bus is fined; and (ii) Amarbold has brought
durian on a bus. Conversely, we’ll judge (4) as false if it’s not the case that
bringing durian on a bus is fined; or Amarbold didn’t bring durian on a bus.
Here, using one conversational background isn’t sufficient. Unless
people had not previously infringed the law, the conversational background
would be empty, (4) would be vacuously true and this result would contradict
our intuition that (4) is true if (i) and (ii) are true. By using two conversational
backgrounds, we can make explicit the difference between the ways in which
facts about Amarbold’s actions and facts about the law impact the truth
conditions of propositions such as (4).
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The modal base f assigns to any evaluation world a set of propositions
describing the relevant circumstances, say, Amarbold’s actions. Since in our
evaluation world Amarbold brought durian on a bus, the modal base will
assign the proposition that ‘Amarbold brought durian on a bus’ to this world.
And the ordering source g will assign to any evaluation world a set of
propositions P whose truth the law demands – and which we can use to order
the worlds in the modal base.
For any pair of worlds u and v we say that u comes closer than v to the
ideal g(w) establishes if and only if the set of propositions from g(w) that are
true in v is a proper subset of the set of propositions from P that are true in u.
For our example, suppose that P contains the following two
propositions: (i) nobody brings durian on a bus; and (ii) anybody who brings
durian on a bus pays a fine. Any world in the modal base in which Amarbold
pays a fine will count as better than an otherwise similar world where he
doesn’t. In other words, (4) claims that in the best worlds (among those where
Amarbold brings durian on a bus), he pays a fine.
Using the definitions we’ve seen so far, we can prove that if g is a
realistic conversational background, then for all worlds w and v, w is at least
as close as v to an ideal which the ordering source determines. We’ll rely on
this lemma later.
Lemma 1: If g is a realistic conversational background, then for all
worlds w and v, w is at least as close as v to an ideal which the ordering source
g(w) determines.
Proof: Suppose g is a realistic conversational background, so from the
definition of a realistic conversational background, w is compatible with the
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conversational background (i.e. every proposition in the conversational
background g(w) is true in w. But suppose p is in the conversational
background g(w) and p is true in v. Since p is in the conversational
background g(w) and w is compatible with that background (i.e. every
proposition in that background is true in w), p is true in w. So all the
propositions in the conversational background that are true in v are true in w.
So w is at least as close as v to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines.
So much for defining the concepts of world w, modal base f and
ordering source g, and proving a lemma. We turn to defining additional modal
relations (such as necessity and possibility) and the truth conditions of the
indicative conditional.

Necessity and possibility
‘Simplifying slightly, a proposition is a necessity just in case it is true in all
accessible worlds that come closest to the ideal determined by the ordering
source’ (Kratzer, 2012, p. 40). So ‘Amarbold must pay a fine’ would be a
necessity if in all worlds that came closest to the ideal – where (i) nobody
brings durian on a bus; and (ii) anybody who brings durian on a bus pays a
fine – it were true that Amarbold pays a fine. Simplifying less, a proposition p
is a necessity in w with respect to f and g if, for all worlds u in the set of
worlds where all propositions in the modal base are true, there’s a world v in
that set of all worlds such that:
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines
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and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all propositions in the
modal base f(w) are true: if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which the
ordering source g(w) determines, then p is true in z.
Again, using this definition, we can prove that for any world w and realistic
backgrounds f and g and proposition p, if ‘necessarily p’ is true in w with
respect to f and g, then p is true in w with respect to f and g. We’ll rely on this
lemma later as well.
Lemma 2: For any world w and realistic backgrounds f and g, if
‘necessarily p’ is true in w with respect to f and g, then p is true in w with
respect to f and g.
Proof: Suppose ‘necessarily p’ is true in w with respect to f and g. Then
from the definition of a realistic conversational background, all propositions in
the modal base f(w) are true in w. So from the definition of ordering source,
there’s a world v in the set of worlds where all propositions in the modal base
are true in it and:
(i) v is at least as close as w to the ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines
and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all propositions in the
modal base f(w) are true: if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which the
ordering source g(w) determines, then p is true in z.
From (ii) and the fact that all propositions in the modal base f(w) are
true in w it follows that if v is at least as close as w to the ideal which the
ordering source g(w) determines, p is true in w. But from Lemma 1, we know

113

v is at least as close as w to the ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines. So p is true in w. QED.
Next, turning to possibility: ‘A proposition is a possibility in w with
respect to f and g if and only if its negation (that is, its complement) is not a
necessity in w with respect to f and g’ (Kratzer, 2012, p. 40). So ‘Amarbold
must pay a fine’ is possible if in at least one world that came closest to the
ideal, Amarbold pays a fine.
Finally, we turn to conditionals.

Indicative conditional
According to premise semantics, for any propositions p and q, ‘If p then
(modal) q’ is true in w with respect to f and g if and only if ‘(modal) q’ is true
in w with respect to f* and g, where for all worlds u, f*(u) = f(u) È {p}, or the
original modal base with the addition of p (Kratzer, 2012, p. 94).9 Note that
where the conditional is a bare conditional ‘If p, then q’ (i.e. where there is no
modal), we add a necessity modal such that it reads ‘If p, then necessarily q’.

Beyond indicative conditionals, different kinds of conditionals depend on the
settings for f and g. For example:

Material implication

9

Later, the ‘+’ in f+ will serve the same purpose as the * in f*, viz. to
represent the original modal base È the relevant conditional’s antecedent, i.e.
the new modal base. I’ll be using + rather than * so that later, when I prove
Import-Export (in Theorem 3 in subsection 3.1.2.), I can speak of two new
modal bases separately before showing that they are one and the same.
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Characterising the material conditional are a totally realistic modal base f
(again, where f assigns to any world a set of propositions that characterises it
uniquely) and an empty ordering source g (Kratzer, 2012, pp. 65-6).
Proof for conditional ‘If p, then q’ (Kratzer offers a ‘Sketch of proof’
and, in what follows, I fill out her sketch):
Case 1: Suppose p is true in w. Then Ç f+(w) = {w}. In other words, the set of
all worlds where all the propositions in the new modal base are true contains
only w. The set of all worlds where all the propositions in the original modal
base are true contained only w (because we’re taking f to be a totally realistic
modal base); the set of all worlds where all the propositions in the new modal
base are true is equal to the set of all worlds where all the propositions in the
original modal base and p are true; and all the propositions in the original
modal base are true in w and, with the supposition, so too is p. But then we get
the following biconditional:
q is a necessity in w with respect to f+ and g if and only if q is true in
w.
To prove the left-to-right proposition in the biconditional:
Suppose q is true in w to prove that q is a necessity in w with respect to
f+ and g. According to the definition of necessity, for q to be a necessity in w
with respect to f+ and g, it must be the case that for all worlds u (in the set of
worlds where all propositions in the modal base are true), there’s a v such that
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines; and
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(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all propositions in the
modal base f(w) are true: if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which the
ordering source g(w) determines, then q is true in z.
And that is the case for all worlds u. There’s only one world in the set
of worlds where all propositions in the modal base are true, namely w; and for
it, there does exist a world such that (i) and (ii), namely w again. When it
comes to (i), w is at least as close as itself to an ideal which the empty
ordering determines; and when it comes to (ii), again, there’s only one world
in the set of worlds where all the propositions in the modal base are true,
namely w, it’s as least as close as itself to the ideal which the ordering source
determines and, given our assumption, q is true in w. So q is a necessity in w
with respect to f+ and g.
Next, to prove the right-to-left proposition in the biconditional ‘q is a
necessity in w with respect to f+ and g if and only if q is true in w’:
Suppose q is a necessity in w to prove that q is true in w. Again,
according to Lemma 2, for q to be a necessity in w with respect to f+ and g, q
must be true in w. So, given our assumption, q is true in w.
Case 2: Suppose p is false in w. Then Ç f+(w) = Æ. In other words, the
set of all worlds where all the propositions in the modal base are true is empty.
But then q is trivially a necessity in w with respect to f+ and g. According to
the definition of necessity, q is a necessity in w if, all worlds u (in the set of
worlds where all propositions in the modal base are true), there’s a v such that
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines
and
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(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all propositions in the
modal base f(w) are true: if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which the
ordering source g(w) determines, then q is true in z. And here, there are no
worlds u.

Multiple-world-theorist conditionals10
Characterising a conditional as the multiple-world theorist understands it is an
empty modal base f and a totally realistic ordering source g (Kratzer, 2012, p.
66). To spell this out, a conditional ‘If α, then (necessarily) β’ is true in w with
respect to an empty modal base f and a totally realistic ordering source g if and
only if, for all worlds u in the set of worlds where all propositions in the modal
base and α are true, there’s a world v in that set of all worlds such that:
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines
and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all propositions in the
modal base f(w) and α are true: if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which
the ordering source g(w) determines, then β is true in z.
Here, we can interpret the ‘at least as close as … to the ideal which the
ordering source determines’ relation (the symbol for which we saw earlier
being £g(w)) in premise semantics as denoting the similarity relation in the
multiple-world theory.

10

Kratzer (2012) calls them counterfactuals, following Lewis (1973). But we
can call them multiple-world-theorist conditionals, following our imaginary
Lewis (which I introduced in Chapter 1 section 2). Kratzer’s definition leaves
open the possibility of the antecedent being true, like in an indicative.
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For the premise semanticist’s relation to correspond with the multipleworld theorist’s it would need to possess the following three properties: (i)
reflexivity; (ii) transitivity; and (iii) that if a possible world w is closer than
another v to the ideal which the ordering source determines, then v isn’t equal
to w.
And the premise semanticist’s relation possesses (i), (ii) and (iii). We
get (i) and (ii) from the definition of a totally realistic ordering source. As
we’ve seen, according to the definition, a set of propositions A can induce an
ordering £A on a set of possible worlds W such that a possible world w is at
least as close as a possible world z to the ideal A determines if and only if all
propositions of A that are true in z are true in w as well. Here, the ‘all’ in the
second half of the biconditional endows the relation with the property of
reflexivity: for all modal bases f, worlds w and v, v £f(w) v. The ‘all’ also
endows the relation with the property of transitivity: for all f, w, u, v, t, if u
£f(w) v and v £f(w) t, then u £f(w) t.
And we get (iii) from the definition of totally realistic conversational
background as we apply it to the ordering source. A totally realistic ordering
source is a function g such that for any w, w Î Ç g(w) = {w}. Here, a totally
realistic g assigns to any world a set of propositions that characterises it
uniquely and so it’s not possible for two worlds to hold the same place in the
ordering – or be equally similar – unless they are one and the same.
Note that (iii) is stronger than Lemma 1. Recall, according to Lemma
1, if g is a realistic conversational background, then for all worlds w and v, w
is at least as close as v to an ideal which the ordering source g(w) determines.
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This allows for a relation of ‘less than or equal to’. (iii) in contrast doesn’t
allow equality. (iii) ensures that the relation is one of ‘strictly less than’.
Now, using the definition of indicative conditional, we can prove that
modus ponens (with realistic backgrounds f and g) is valid. We’ll rely on this
lemma to prove that modus tollens (with realistic backgrounds f and g) is valid
and later as well.
Theorem 1: For any world w and realistic conversational backgrounds f
and g, if ‘If p, then (necessarily) q’ is true in world w with respect to f and g
and p is true in w, then q is true in w.
Proof: Suppose ‘If p, then (necessarily) q’ is true in world w with
respect to f and g and p is true in w. Then from the definition of an indicative
conditional, ‘(necessarily) q’ is true in w with respect to f* and g where the
new modal base f*(w) is the old one plus p.
Since f is realistic, w is compatible with the old modal base f(w). But
since p is true in w, it follows that all the propositions in f*(w), the old modal
base f(w) plus p, are true in w. So w is compatible with the new modal base
f*(w).
So from the definition of necessity, there’s another world v compatible
with the new modal base f*(w) such that v is at least as close as w to the ideal
the ordering source g(w) determines, and for any world z compatible with the
new modal base f*(w), if z is as close as v to the ideal with respect to g(w),
then q is true in z.
But since g is realistic, it follows from Lemma 1 that w is as close as v
to the ideal with respect to g(w). So it follows that q is true in w. QED.
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Using this lemma, we can prove that modus tollens (with realistic
backgrounds f and g) is valid.
Theorem 2: For any world w and realistic conversational backgrounds f
and g, if ‘If p, then (necessarily) q’ is true in world w with respect to f and g
and ¬ q is true in w, then ¬ p is true in w.
Proof: Let ‘If p, then (necessarily) q’ and ¬ q be true in world w with
respect to f and g. Now suppose for reductio that ¬ p is false in w. Then p is
true in w. So by modus ponens, q is also true in w. But this contradicts the
initial assumption that ¬ q is true in w. So ¬ p is true in w. QED.

2. The good and the bad
So far, we’ve seen premise semantics’ truth conditions for an indicative
conditional, necessity and possibility. Next, we turn to the theory’s response to
apparent counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens. When it comes
to such arguments, premise semantics give us some results we want and others
we don’t. Let’s consider responses to counterexamples which fall into three
categories: (i) having a realistic modal base but non-realistic ordering source;
(ii) having a non-realistic modal base but a realistic ordering source; and (iii)
having realistic modal base and ordering source.

2.1. Realistic f and non-realistic g
Premise semantics can explain Miners, an apparent counterexample to modus
tollens.

Miners (Kolodny & MacFarlane, 2010, pp. 115 and 128)
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The argument takes the following context:
Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but we do not
know which. Flood waters threaten to flood the shafts. We have
enough sandbags to block one shaft, but not both. If we block one
shaft, all the water will go into the other shaft, killing any miners
inside it. If we block neither shaft, both shafts will fill halfway with
water, and just one miner, the lowest in the shaft, will be killed
(Kolodny & MacFarlane, 2010, p. 115).
Given this scenario, Kolodny and MacFarlane build a paradox with the
following two premises and conclusion:
(5) It’s not the case we ought to block shaft A.
(6) If the miners are in shaft A, then we ought to block shaft A.
(7) Therefore, it’s not the case the miners are in shaft A.
They see this as a paradox inasmuch as we might accept the premises while
rejecting the conclusion even though the conclusion follows by modus tollens.
We might take (5) as the ‘obvious’ outcome of our deliberation. We don’t
know in which shaft the miners are but we know that, given our limited
knowledge, blocking neither shaft is the option we ought to take: we ought to
save the greatest number of miners and, by blocking neither shaft, we could
guarantee that all but one miner survived; by not doing so, i.e. blocking shaft
A or blocking shaft B, we could risk killing all the miners. (5) follows from the
proposition ‘We ought to block neither shaft’. We might accept (6) on the
grounds that again, we ought to save the greatest number of miners. However,
we reject (7) on the grounds that we remain agnostic about the exact location
of the miners (Kolodny & MacFarlane, 2010, p. 128).
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Premise semantics can account for this paradox. The theory takes
arguments with the following form to be invalid:
Not-Ought q.
If p, then Ought q.
Therefore, not-p.
Where we are dealing with ‘oughts’, the ordering source isn’t realistic because
it’s not the case that the actual world is most-similar to itself. If it were (i.e. if
the ordering source with ‘oughts’ were realistic), then it would follow by
Lemma 2 that whatever we ought to do, we do. Lemma 2 shows that for any
world w and realistic backgrounds f and g, if ‘necessarily p’ is true in w with
respect to f and g, then p is true in w with respect to f and g. So with a realistic
ordering source, if I ought to do my homework, I do my homework – and
since that would be a bad result, we say the ordering source isn’t realistic.
Now, modus tollens with a non-realistic ordering source is invalid.
Here, with the actual world containing fewer true/more false propositions than
other worlds relative to the ideal world, we have a non-realistic ordering
source and thereby an invalid modus tollens.
Consider the following counterexample:

Counterexample 1
Let w be the actual world, t be a possible world, f be a realistic modal base and
g be a non-realistic ordering source. Furthermore, let ‘The miners are in shaft
A’ and ‘It’s not the case that we block shaft A’ be true in w, and ‘The miners
are in shaft A’ and ‘We block shaft A’ be true in t. Finally, let the ordering
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source g(w) contain ‘The miners are in shaft A and we block shaft A’, and let
the modal base f(w) be empty.
Then modus tollens is invalid. The premises can be true and the
conclusion false. The second premise ‘If the miners are in shaft A, then we
ought to block shaft A’ is true in w with respect to f and g if and only if ‘We
ought to block shaft A’ is true in w with respect to the updated modal base
f*(w), and the ordering source g(w). And ‘We ought to block shaft A’ is true in
w with respect to the updated modal base f*(w), and the ordering source g if
and only if for all possible worlds u in the set of worlds where all propositions
in the updated modal base f*(w) are true, there’s another possible world v in
that set such that:
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which g(w) determines; and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all the propositions in the
updated modal base f*(w) are true, if z is at least as close as v to the ideal
which g(w) determines, then ‘We block shaft A’ is true in z.
And that is the case. Since ‘The miners are in shaft A’ is true in both w
and t, w and t are in the set of all worlds where all the propositions in the
updated modal base f*(w) are true, and for both w and t, (i) and (ii) are
satisfied. Where u is w, there’s a v, namely t. (i) For t to be at least as close
relative to g(w) as w, at least as many propositions in g(w) must be true in t as
in w and that’s the case. In t, one proposition in g(w) is true (namely ‘The
miners are in shaft A and we block shaft A’) while in w, no proposition in g(w)
is true.
And (ii), for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all the propositions
in the updated modal base f*(w) are true, if z is at least as close as v to the
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ideal which g determines, then ‘We block shaft A’ is true in z. Here, the only
relevant worlds z can be is w and t. The conditional in (ii) holds true for w and
t: since ‘We block shaft A’ is indeed true in w and t, the conditional has a true
consequent.
Next, where u is t, there’s also a v, etc. namely, t itself. (i) is satisfied
because t is at least as close as itself. Likewise, (ii) is satisfied for the same
reason as above: the consequent of the conditional is true. So the second
premise is true. So too is the first.
‘It’s not the case we ought to block shaft A’ is true in w with respect to
the modal base f and the ordering source g if and only if ‘We ought to block
shaft A’ is false in that context. And it is false in that context if and only if
there exists no possible world u (in the set of worlds where all propositions in
the modal base f(w) are true) for which there is a possible world v in that set
such that:
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which g(w) determines; and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all the propositions in the
modal base are true, if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which g(w)
determines, then ‘We block shaft A’ is true in z.
And this is the case. Where u is t, there are two possible v-worlds – t
itself and w – and in neither case are (i) and (ii) both satisfied. Where the vworld is t itself, (i) is satisfied (t is as close as t) but (ii) isn’t: let the z-world
be w. w is in the set of worlds where all propositions in the modal base f(w)
are true but it’s not the case that ‘We block shaft A’ is true in w. Moreover,
where the v-world is w, (i) isn’t satisfied: w isn’t as close as t. While one
proposition in g(w) is true in t, none is true in w.
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Next, where u is w, again there are two possible v-worlds – w itself and
t – and in neither case are (i) and (ii) both satisfied. Where the v-world is t, (i)
is satisfied (t is at least as close as w; one proposition in g(w) is true in t, none
is true in w) but (ii) isn’t: let the z-world be w. w is in the set of worlds where
all propositions in the modal base f(w) are true but it’s not the case that ‘We
block shaft A’ is true in w. Moreover, where the v-world is w itself, (i) is
satisfied (w is as close as w) but (ii) isn’t: again, w is in the set of worlds
where all propositions in the modal base f(w) are true but it’s not the case that
‘We block shaft A’ is true in w.
So ‘We ought to block shaft A’ is false so ‘It’s not the case we ought to
block shaft A’ is true in w with respect to the modal base f and the ordering
source g, and so the first premise is true.

The theory can also explain Miners (bis), an apparent counterexample
to modus ponens. Using the same scenario as they did in the original Miners,
Kolodny and MacFarlane build a paradox with the following four premises,
and conclusion:

Miners (bis) (Kolodny & MacFarlane, 2010, pp. 115-6)
(8) We ought to block neither shaft.
(9) If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
(10) If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
(11) Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B.
(12) Therefore, either we ought to block shaft A or we ought to block
shaft B.
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They see this as a paradox inasmuch as we might accept the premises while
rejecting the conclusion. As in their first paradox, we might take (8) as the
‘obvious’ outcome of our deliberation. If we don’t know in which shaft the
miners are, blocking the shaft in which they aren’t would result in the death of
all miners and blocking neither shaft would guarantee that all but one miner
survived, we ought to take the option that guarantees we will save the greatest
number of miners. We accept (9) and (10) on the grounds that again, we ought
to save the greatest number of miners. We accept (11) given the specific
details of the scenario. While (12) appears to follow from (8) through (11), we
might not accept it. It’s incompatible with (8) (Kolodny & MacFarlane, 2010,
pp. 115-6). 11
Premise semantics can also account for this counterexample. We are
effectively drawing the conclusion using two modus ponens with the
following form and the theory takes arguments with such a form to be invalid:
p.
If p, then Ought q.
Therefore, Ought q.
As we saw above, where we are dealing with ‘oughts’, the ordering source
isn’t realistic and modus ponens with a non-realistic ordering source is invalid.
11

Note that I’m taking the modal to be a subjective ‘ought’ rather than an
objective ‘ought’. Following Wedgwood (2016), I’m taking ‘ought’ to express
more objective concepts when what an agent ought to do at a given time may
be determined by facts that neither agent nor friends or advisers either knows
or is even in a position to know. And I’m taking ‘ought’ to express more
subjective concepts when what an agent ought to do is in some way more
sensitive to the informational state that the agent (or his advisors or the like)
find themselves in at the conversationally salient time.
Here, given our informational state, it’s true that we ‘ought’
(subjective) to block neither shaft A nor shaft B.
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Here, with the actual world containing fewer true/more false propositions than
other worlds relative to the ideal world, we have a non-realistic ordering
source and thereby an invalid modus ponens.
Consider the following counterexample:

Counterexample 2
Assume the same as in Counterexample 1, the counterexample to modus
tollens with a non-realistic ordering source. Then modus ponens is invalid.
The premises can be true and the conclusion false. ‘If the miners are in shaft
A, then we block shaft A’ is true in w with respect to f and g for the same
reason in Counterexample 1. So the second premise is true. So too is the first
given our assumption that ‘The miners are in shaft A’ is true in w. And the
conclusion is false. ‘We ought to block shaft A’ is true in w with respect to the
modal base f and the ordering source g if and only if ‘It’s not the case we
ought to block shaft A’ is false in that context. And, as we saw above, that
isn’t the case. Indeed, ‘It’s not the case we ought to block shaft A’ is true in w
with respect to the modal base f and the ordering source g and so ‘We ought to
block shaft A’ – the conclusion – is false in that context.

2.2. Non-realistic f and realistic g
Premise semantics can also explain Marble, an apparent counterexample to
modus tollens.

Marble (Yalcin, 2012, pp. 1001-2)
This argument involves the following context:
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We have an urn containing 100 marbles, a mix of blue and red, big and small.
The breakdown is the following:

Marbles

Blue

Red

Big

10

30

Small

50

10

Table 4: Breakdown of the blue/red/big/small marbles in the urn

We select at random a marble and place it under a cup.
Given this context, we can derive the following modus tollens
(13) If the marble is big, then it’s likely red.
(14) The marble is not likely red.
(15) Therefore, the marble is not big.
In this argument, we’re inclined to believe the premises but disinclined to
believe the conclusion – even if it appears to follow by modus tollens.
Premise semantics’ diagnosis would be the following: the argument is
invalid; it’s a modus tollens with a realistic ordering source but a non-realistic
modal base – and such arguments are invalid.
Consider the following counterexample:

Counterexample 3
Let w be the actual world and f be a non-realistic modal base. Furthermore, let
‘The marble is big’ and ‘The marble is not red’ be true in w. Finally, let ‘It’s
not the case the marble is big’ be a proposition in the modal base. That means
the set of worlds where all the propositions in the updated modal base are true
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is empty. The updated modal base contains the contradictory propositions ‘It’s
not the case the marble is big’ and ‘The marble is big’.
Then modus tollens is invalid. The premises are true and the
conclusion false. The first premise is true in w with respect to the updated
modal base, and the ordering source because for all possible worlds u (in the
set of worlds where all the propositions in the updated modal base are true) in
the definition of necessity, the definition is vacuously satisfied.
The second premise is also true. ‘The marble is not likely red’ is true in
w with respect to the modal base f and the ordering source g if and only if ‘The
marble is likely red’ is false in that context. And it’s false in that context if and
only if there exists no possible world u (in the set of worlds where all
propositions in the modal base f(w) are true) for which there is a possible
world v in that set such that:
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which g(w) determines; and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all the propositions in the
modal base are true, if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which g(w)
determines, then ‘The marble is red’ is true in z.
And there is no such possible world u. As there’s no possible world
compatible with the modal base simpliciter, it’s vacuously true that there’s no
possible world compatible with the modal base for which there’s a possible
world v in that set such that (i) and (ii). We get this for free.
So ‘The marble is likely red’ is false so ‘The marble is not likely red’
is true in w with respect to the modal base f and the ordering source g, and so
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the second premise is true. And the conclusion is false given our assumption
that ‘The marble is big’.12

Of course, for this counterexample to apply to Marble, the premise
semanticist must argue that rather than signaling probability, ‘likely’ signals a
non-realistic modal base. And this she can do. In Marble, the modal base is
non-realistic because the line of inference from ‘Likely p’ to ‘Therefore, p’ is
invalid. For example, just because it was likely that Britain would vote to
remain in the EU, it didn’t follow that Britain would vote to remain in the EU.
And for the line of inference to be invalid, the modal base or ordering source
must be non-realistic.
Here, the former is. Supposing ‘Likely p’ is a member of the modal
base, we can imagine another proposition u – which follows from ‘(Likely) p’
but which is false – will also be a member. In our Brexit example, let p be
‘Britain would vote to leave the EU’, we can imagine u being ‘The pound
would not weaken on 24 June 2016’. u follows from ‘(Likely) p’ but is false.13

12

While one might think I’m treating ‘likely’ as a necessity modal identical to
‘must’, I’m not. I’m taking ‘likely’ to be dissimilar to ‘must’ inasmuch as
‘likely’ doesn’t have a realistic modal base (as we’ll see below) while ‘must’
does. (If ‘likely’ did have a realistic modal base (and a realistic ordering
source), ‘likely p’ would entail p – a result we’d reject. One might imagine a
weak ‘must’ which is closer to ‘likely’ – e.g. ‘You must be joking!’ – but that
is different from the strong (epistemic) ‘must’ with which I’m contrasting
‘likely’ above.
13
Here, granted but still consistent with the statement in the previous footnote,
I’m taking ‘likely’ to be similar to ‘must’ inasmuch as it’s a quantifier over
possible-worlds compatible with the modal base. Again, one might imagine a
weak ‘likely’ which is closer to ‘most’. Then, perhaps, one might argue that
‘likely’ takes a realistic modal base while still explaining why the inference
from ‘likely p’ to p is invalid. If I’m not arguing this, it’s because the
argument would require a different theory, one facing the daunting task of
explaining the semantics of ‘most’ – and not one falling within the remit of
this thesis.
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Turning back to Marble, we see that ‘likely’ signals a non-realistic
modal base and, as the counterexample demonstrates, modus tollens with such
a modal base is invalid. Just as it did with Miners, premise semantics produce
a desired result with Marble.14
Premise semantics give us, however, the undesired result that a modus
ponens version of Marble is invalid – when we might not take it to be so.
Consider the following argument, assuming the same context as that of
the original Marble:

Marble (bis)
(13) If the marble is big, then it’s likely red.
(16) The marble is big.
(17) Therefore, the marble is likely red.

On premise semantics, we can construct a counterexample to such a modus
ponens, i.e. one where the ordering source is realistic but the modal base isn’t.

Counterexample 4
Assume the same as above. The first premise is true for the same reason as
above. The second is so too given our assumption that ‘The marble is big’ is
14

One might wonder whether one can analyse ‘likely’ in terms of
quantification over a set of worlds which an ordering source orders, or
whether one must appeal to probability functions (in the mathematical sense)
to model its semantics. If I don’t address this matter here, it’s because I don’t
want to get into a level of detail such as that. One reason being the particular
semantics of ‘likely’ don’t seem to be crucial to the argument. Indeed, one
could change ‘likely’ to ‘normally’ and construct another counterexample.
Nevertheless, I point the interested reader to Yalcin (2010). It gives some
arguments against the premise semanticist’s treatment of ‘likely’ and one in
favour of putting to work probability functions in the semantics.
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true in w. And the conclusion is false. As we saw above, it’s not the case ‘The
marble is likely red’ is true in w.

2.3. Realistic f and non-realistic g (bis)
Moreover, premise semantics can’t explain Lottery, another apparent
counterexample to modus tollens.

Lottery (Cantwell, 2008, p. 331)
(18) If you don’t buy a lottery ticket, you can’t win.
(19) You can win.
(20) Therefore, you do buy a lottery ticket.

Here, we have an argument that appears to have realistic both modal base and
ordering source – and, according to premise semantics, such an argument is
valid. The proof relies on the validity of modus ponens with a realistic modal
base and a totally realistic ordering source.
Proof: Let p be ‘You buy a lottery ticket’ and q be ‘You win’. For any
world w and a realistic modal base f and a totally realistic ordering source g, if
‘If not-p, then necessarily not-q’ and ‘possibly q’ are true in world w with
respect to f and g, then p is true in w.
Suppose for reductio that ‘If not-p, then necessarily not-q’, ‘not-p’ and
‘possibly q’ are true in world w with respect to f and g. Then from the
definition of an indicative conditional, ‘necessarily not-q’ is true in w with
respect to f* and g where the new modal base f*(w) is the old one plus not-p.
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Since f is realistic, w is compatible with the old modal base f(w). But
since not-p is true in w, it follows that all the propositions in f*(w) (the old
modal base f(w) plus not-p) are true in w. So w is compatible with the new
modal base f*(w).
So from the definition of necessity, there’s another world t compatible
with the new modal base f*(w) such that t is at least as close as w to the ideal
the ordering source g(w) determines, and for any world y compatible with the
new modal base f*(w), if y is as close as t to the ideal with respect to g(w),
then not-q is true in y. And since g is realistic, it follows from Lemma 1 that w
is as close as t to the ideal with respect to g(w). So it follows that not-q is true
in w.
Moreover, it follows that ‘necessarily not-q’ is true in w with respect to
f and g, since according to the definition of necessity a proposition p is a
necessity in w with respect to f and g if, for all worlds u in the set of worlds
where all propositions in the modal base are true, there’s a world v in that set
of all worlds such that:
(i) v is at least as close as u to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines
and
(ii) for all worlds z in the set of worlds where all propositions in the
modal base f(w) are true: if z is at least as close as v to the ideal which the
ordering source g(w) determines, then p is true in z.
Here, for all worlds u, there’s a v, namely w. w satisfies both (i) and
(ii): w is at least as close as u to an ideal which the ordering source g(w)
determines (so we saw following from Lemma 1); and p is true in w. The

133

relevant conditional reads ‘if z is at least as close as w to the ideal which the
ordering source determines, then not-q is true in w’ and not-q is indeed true in
z – and, since we’re assuming a totally realistic ordering source, the only
world z could be is w.
But then ‘necessarily not-q’ and ‘possibly q’ would both be true in w.
Or in other words, ‘not possibly q’ and ‘possibly q’ would both be true in w.
So not-p must be false in w. In other words, ‘not not-p’ must be true there. In
yet other words, p must be true in w. QED.
It’s important to specify that here we’re assuming a totally realistic
ordering source g (or ‘centering’ as Lewis would call it (Lewis, 1998, p. 82)).
According to this specification, there can be no world u as close to the world
w as w itself (where u and w aren’t identical). This assumption is necessary for
us to find w is the only possible world z could be. If we didn’t assume a totally
realistic ordering source g, then we could derive a proof that Lottery is invalid.
We could show that it’s possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
false, as follows.
Suppose p and q are false in the actual world w; p and q are true in
world u; and the modal base is realistic: f(w) is equal to {w, u}. In this
scenario, ‘If not-p, then (necessarily) not-q’ is true in w with respect to f. The
antecedent restricts the modal base to contain only not-p-worlds, in our
scenario w is the only not-p world (f*(w) = {w}), and not-q is true in w. So the
first premise in Lottery would be true. So too would the second because there
exists a world in the unrestricted modal base in which q is true, namely u. But
the conclusion would be false because p is false in w.
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We see where the ordering source isn’t totally realistic, Lottery is
invalid. This is consistent with the results so far. For realistic f and partly
realistic g, modus tollens falls – as does modus ponens. The symmetry when it
comes to the validity/invalidity of the two argument forms persists.
Still, maintaining the assumption, we see that premise semantics don’t
offer us a result we want: namely that Lottery is invalid. Moreover, they offer
us a result we don’t want: namely that Lottery is valid. This is just the
beginning.

Premise

semantics

can’t

explain

Break-in,

yet

another

counterexample to modus tollens – and in the following section, we’ll see that
the theory offers us more results we don’t want.

Break-in (Yalcin, 2012, p. 1003)
(21) If there is a break-in, the alarm always sounds.
(22) It is not the case that the alarm always sounds.
(23) Therefore, there is no break-in.

Here, just as ‘must’ (can’t win=necessarily you do not win=must not win) did,
‘always’ takes realistic conversational backgrounds and so premise semantics
find the argument valid.
Of course, in an attempt to save her theory, the premise semanticist
could argue that must/always need not take such backgrounds. In doing so,
however, she’d be giving up the non-straightforward version of not only
modus tollens but also modus ponens (and this would mean giving up the
modus ponens version of Lottery, which we think is valid. It reads ‘If you
don’t buy a lottery ticket, you can’t win’ and ‘You don’t buy a lottery ticket’,
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‘Therefore, you can’t win’). Indeed, as we’ll see in the following section, for
her, modus ponens and modus tollens stand or fall together.

3. Premise semantics on the Election and Barbershop paradoxes
So far, we’ve seen premise semantics offers proofs and counterexamples
which explain some of our intuitions but contradict others. We noted that for
the premise semanticist, modus ponens and modus tollens stand or fall
together. Where we can derive proofs that one argument form (with realistic or
non-realistic modal base or ordering source) is valid, we can derive proofs that
the other (with the equivalent modal base or ordering source) is also valid.
And where we can build counterexamples for the one (with realistic or nonrealistic modal base or ordering source), we can build counterexamples for the
other (with the equivalent base or source). Whether we are looking at modus
ponens or modus tollens, the first premise will be true for the same reason.
The second premise will be true given our assumptions. And the conclusion
will be true or false given our assumptions too.
Next, we turn to examine how the premise semanticist would respond
specifically to the paradoxes we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, i.e. the Election and
Barbershop paradoxes.

3.1. The Election Paradox
Recall the three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent theses:
#1 the argument’s premises are true and conclusion, false;
#2 the argument is an instance of modus ponens; and
#3 modus ponens is valid.
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3.1.1. On #2
The premise semanticist could reject #2, arguing that the argument isn’t an
instance of modus ponens. According to the premise semanticist, an instance
of modus ponens is an argument with the form ‘If p, then (necessarily) q’ and
p therefore q where we replace p and q with propositions – and the Election
paradox doesn’t meet this definition. Indeed, the covert necessity modal
doesn’t appear in the right place. While the definition places the
‘(necessarily)’ before the consequent of the main connective conditional, the
Election paradox places it before the consequent of the embedded conditional.
Indeed, the first premise in the Election paradox has the form ‘If p, then if q,
then (necessarily) r’.
Of course, strictly speaking, the premise semanticist’s modus ponens is
not the same as the classical logician’s. The premise semanticist’s modus
ponens looks like the following:
(i)
If p, then (necessarily) q.
p.
Therefore, q.
While the classical logician’s looks like the following:
(ii)
If p, then q.
p.
Therefore, q.
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In the argument meeting the premise semanticist’s definition, the proposition q
falls within the scope of a covert modal in the first premise but not in the
conclusion. In the argument meeting the classical logician’s, that’s not the
case.
That said, the premise semanticist’s Election paradox is consistent with
the classical logician’s modus ponens. Aside from seeing the form of the
second premise and the antecedent of the first as being identical, the premise
semanticist sees the consequent of the first premise and the conclusion as so
too: in each conditional, the proposition q doesn’t fall within the scope of a
covert modal while the proposition r does. And we can reduce an argument
with the form ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ and p, therefore ‘if q, then
(necessarily) r’ to a simple classical logic modus ponens ((ii) above).
So, while rejecting #2, the premise semanticist would acknowledge
that the argument has the form of the semantic counterpart to modus ponens.
The second premise and antecedent of the first appear to have the same
meaning; likewise the conclusion and the consequent of the first premise.

3.1.2. On #3
The premise semanticist would accept #3. Assuming her definition of modus
ponens, she’d argue the argument form is valid (Khoo, 2013, p. 161). Her
definition extends only to arguments with the form I mention above as (i) and
will call simple modus ponens’: ‘If p, then (necessarily) q’ and p therefore q –
where we replace p and q with propositions. It doesn’t extend to arguments
with the different form I’ll call ‘complex “modus ponens”’: ‘If p, then if q,
then (necessarily) r’ and p therefore ‘If q, then (necessarily) r’.
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Indeed, while we can derive a proof that premise semantics validates
simple modus ponens, we can’t derive one that validates complex modus
ponens too. Rather, we can build a counterexample showing that it’s possible
for ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ to be true in world w with respect to f
and g, p to be true in w and ‘If q, then (necessarily) r’ to be false in w.
Let p be true in worlds w and v, q be true in v and u, r be true in v. Let
the modal base f be empty. And let the ordering source g contain not-q and
not-r. As q isn’t true in w, then the modal base for ‘If q, then (necessarily) r’
won’t be realistic and, despite the premises being true, the conclusion will be
false (this draws on the counterexample in Khoo (2013, p. 161, footnote 11)).
This result is consistent with the proofs we’ve derived above. They
prove the validity/invalidity of simple modus ponens.
That said, the counterexample suggests that the premise semanticist is
saying two things which are in contradiction: on the one hand, premise
semantics (at least with a realistic f and totally realistic g) is equivalent to the
multiple-world theory; and on the other hand, Import-Export is valid and
complex modus ponens (at least with realistic f and g) is invalid – when,
contrariwise, the multiple-world theorist finds Import-Export invalid and
complex modus ponens valid.
Now, the counterexample offers a second reason for thinking that
premise semantics isn’t a generalisation of the possible-worlds theory. The
first is that, as we’ve seen, the possible-worlds theory invalidates ImportExport and, as we’ll see, premise semantics validates it.
Theorem 3: For any world w and realistic conversational backgrounds f
and g, if ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ is true in world w with respect to

139

f and g if and only if ‘If p and q, then (necessarily) r’ is true in world w with
respect to f and g.
Proof: Suppose ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ is true in world w
with respect to f and g. By the definition of the indicative conditional, it
follows that ‘If q, then (necessarily) r’ is true in world w with respect to f* and
g, where f*(w) is equal to the old modal base f(w) È {p}. And by once more
the definition indicative conditional, it follows that ‘(necessarily) r’ is true in
world w with respect to f** and g, where f**(w) is equal to the old modal base
f(w) È {p} È {q}.
Next, suppose ‘If p and q, then (necessarily) r’. By the definition of the
indicative conditional, it follows that ‘(necessarily) r’ is true in world w with
respect to f+ where f+(w) is equal to the old modal base f+(w) È ‘p and q’.
Here, f**(w) and f+(w) are equivalent.
Proof:
1. Ç f**(w) = Ç( f(w) È {[[A]]f, g} È {[[B]]f, g})
by definition
2. Ç f(w) Ç {[[A]]f, g} Ç {[[B]]f, g}

from 1 by distributivity

3. Ç f(w) Ç [[A Ù B]]f, g
from 2 by the fact that the set of
worlds at which the conjunction
of two propositions is true is the
intersection of the worlds at
which the conjuncts are true
4. Ç (f(w) È {[[A Ù B]]f, g})

from 3 by distributivity

5. Ç f+(w)

from 4 by stipulation
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Here, we start with the set of all things compatible with f**(w). And by
stipulation, distributivity and the identity between intersection and
conjunction, we can derive the set of all things compatible with f+(w).

Now, there appear to be two possible premise semanticists: let’s call them the
single- and multiple-box theorists.

Single-box theorist
The single-box theorist, on the other hand, formulates the first premise in the
following way:
‘If A, then if B, then (necessarily) C’
According to her, Import-Export is valid and she would cite the proof we saw
above.

Multiple-box theorist
The multiple-box theorist formulates the first premise in the Election paradox
in the following way:
‘If A, then (necessarily) if B, then (necessarily) C’
This theorist corresponds to the multiple-world theorist. Like the multipleworld theorist, the multiple-box theorist would find Import-Export invalid and
cite the proof we saw in Chapter 2 (subsection 3.2.).
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The premise semanticist would do well in choosing to be the singlebox theorist. This theorist can solve the Election Paradox in a way better than
the multiple-box/multiple-world theorist.
The premise semanticist might try to have her cake and eat it too: she
could say that sometimes a conditional contains a single box and other times it
contains multiple boxes. This would allow her to say that modus ponens or
modus tollens are valid when the semantic structure of the premises and
conclusion have the relevant form, and invalid when they don’t.
Of course, if she did adopt this position, it would be incumbent on the
premise semanticist to do some more explaining about invisible boxes and
why, at any given time, conditionals contain the number of boxes she says
they contain. (Kratzer (2012) and Khoo (2013) suggest there should always be
a single box but don’t explain why there couldn’t be two beyond saying that
we most naturally analyse two if-clauses which appear in a row as
successively restricting one and the same operator (Kratzer, 2012, p. 105)). Or
that, since set intersection models domain restriction, conditionals with two ifclauses (i.e. ‘If q, then if r, then s’-type conditionals) and conditionals with
one if-clause and a conjunction as antecedent (i.e. ‘If q and r, then s’-type
conditionals) ‘amount to the same thing’ (Khoo, 2013, p. 157). Indeed, each
conditional contains one modal: while in the case of the two-if clauses ‘if q’
and then ‘if r’ successively restrict a single modal, in the case of the one ifclause ‘if q and r’ restrict a single modal as well.

3.1.3. On #1
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The single-box theorist would accept #1. She would find the premises true and
the conclusion false. The scenario is exactly that in the counterexample above.
q ‘it’s not Reagan who wins’ is false in the actual world and so while the
premise semanticist would find ‘If a Republican wins, then if it’s not Reagan
who wins, then Anderson will’ and ‘a Republican wins’ come out as true, the
conclusion comes out as false.
The multiple-box premise semanticist, on the other hand, would say
what the multiple-world theorist says.

3.2. The Barbershop Paradox
Recall the three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent theses:
#1 the argument is invalid;
#2 the argument is equivalent to an instance of modus tollens (i.e. the
second premise and the consequent of the first are contradictories; and
the conclusion and the antecedent of the first premise are so too); and
#3 modus tollens is valid.

3.2.1. On #1
The single-box theorist would accept #1. It’s possible for the premises to be
true and the conclusion false. Adopting Khoo’s counterexample to complex
‘modus ponens’ (2013, p. 161), we can derive a counterexample showing that,
for any world w and realistic conversational backgrounds f and g, it’s possible
for ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ and ‘If q, then (necessarily) not-r’ to
be true in world w with respect to f and g, and not-p to be false in w. Let p be
true in w and v, q be true in v and u, and r be true in v. Then the first premise is
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true: p, q and r are true in v. So is the second. As r isn’t true in u, so too is the
second premise. And as p is true in w, the conclusion is false.

3.2.2. On #2
With no extra constraint, the premise semanticist would reject that the second
premise and the consequent of the first are contradictories. According to her,
it’s possible for neither ‘If A, then B’ nor ‘If A, then not B’ to be true. Consider
the following scenario: let B be true in world u but false in world v and u and v
be equidistant to the actual world w. Furthermore, let g(w) = ‘Not A’. This
does the trick: the intersection of each u and v and g(w) is empty. (And note
that g is realistic because ‘Not A’ is true in w.) Here, we have two sentences
which are contrary (i.e. can’t both be true) so long as A is compatible with the
modal base but, since they’re not subcontraries (here, it’s possible that they
both be false), the two aren’t contradictories.
That said, adding the constraints which characterise the single-world
theory, the premise semanticist would accept that the second premise and the
consequent of the first are contradictories. The constraints are the following
two: (i) no world w can be more similar to itself than w itself; and (ii) no two
worlds can be equally similar to a third.
Writing the constraints in the language of the premise semanticist, for
the second premise and consequent of the first to be contradictories, we need a
function f such that, for any possible worlds w and v, and proposition p, if v Î
f*(w) (where f*(w) = Ç f(w) È [[p]]), then f*(w) = {v}. This function
guarantees, as (i) and (ii) do, that if a possible world w is closer than another v
to the ideal which the ordering source determines, then v isn’t equal to w.
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With (i) and (ii), premise semantics telescope into the single-world
theory and according to which, as we saw in Chapter 3, the second premise
and the consequent of the first are contradictories.

3.2.3. On #3
The premise semanticist would accept #3 assuming her definition. It extends
only to arguments with the form of a simple modus tollens viz. ‘If p, then
(necessarily) q’ and ‘not q’ therefore ‘not p’ where we replace p and q with
propositions. It doesn’t extend to arguments with the form of a complex
‘modus tollens’, viz. ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ and ‘Not-(If q, then
(necessarily) r’ therefore not-p.
The same counterexample as we saw in the case of complex ‘modus
ponens’ works here to show that complex ‘modus tollens’ isn’t valid. It shows
that it’s possible that, for any world w and realistic conversational
backgrounds f and g, it’s possible for ‘If p, then if q, then (necessarily) r’ to be
true in world w with respect to f and g, ‘not (if q, then (necessarily) r’ to be
true in w and Not-p to be false in w. If q isn’t true in w, then the modal base
for ‘If q, then (necessarily) r’ won’t be realistic and, despite the premises
being true, the conclusion will be false (again, see Khoo (2013 p. 161,
footnote 11) for a complete counterexample).

4. Conclusion
This chapter was about premise semantics for indicative conditionals and
apparent counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens. I offered an
exegesis of premise semantics, defining truth conditions for the indicative
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conditional, necessity and possibility. Moreover, I argued that, when it comes
to counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens with (overt) modal
verbs and adverbs, the theory gives us some results which are consistent with
our intuitions, others which aren’t. Finally, I imagined the response she might
give to the Election and Barbershop paradoxes.
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CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I considered theories of the indicative conditional and apparent
counterexamples to classically valid argument forms. Specifically, I applied
the following four theories which I called:
-

material

-

possible-worlds

-

suppositional; and

-

hybrid

to try and solve the following two counterexamples:
-

McGee’s to modus ponens, which I called the Election paradox;
and

-

Carroll’s to modus tollens, which I called Barbershop paradox.

I argued that none of the theories I considered could explain – without facing
any problems – the individually plausible but jointly inconsistent thesis that
gave rise to the apparent counterexamples. In the case of Election, the theses
were the following:
-

#1 the argument is invalid;

-

#2 the argument is an instance of modus ponens; and

-

#3 modus ponens is valid.

Similarly, in the case of Barbershop, the theses were the following:
-

#1 the argument is invalid;

-

#2 the argument is an instance of modus tollens; and

-

#3 modus tollens is valid.
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The material theory couldn’t explain the plausibility of Thesis #1 in
Election without undermining itself. By introducing the concept of
assertability, the theory found unassertable a sentence we might assert.
In Election, the possible-worlds theory couldn’t explain the plausibility
of #1 at all. It found the first premise – ‘If a Republican wins the election, then
if it’s not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson’ – false yet we might assert it.
As to the suppositional theory, it could only ever explain the
plausibility at most of two theses. In Barbershop, for example, the
suppositional theorist had to choose between explaining Thesis #2 and
explaining Thesis #3. Whether she chose to define modus tollens as allowing
embedded conditionals (‘complex’) or not (‘simple’), she couldn’t explain
both that the argument was an instance of modus tollens and that modus
tollens was valid.
The hybrid theory failed in its raison d’être of making modus ponens
assertibility-preserving. And premise semantics couldn’t explain why we
might take the following argument – a modus ponens version of Marble – to
be valid:
If the marble is big, then it’s likely red.
The marble is big.
Therefore, the marble is likely red.
Indeed, according to premise semantics, we can construct a counterexample
where the ordering source is realistic but the modal base isn’t. And it couldn’t
explain either why we might take the following argument – Lottery – to be
invalid:
If you don’t buy a lottery ticket, you can’t win.
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You can win.
Therefore, you do buy a lottery ticket.
Indeed, according to premise semantics, we can derive a proof that the
argument (with realistic both modal base and ordering source) is valid.
While the literature already acknowledged the surprising implication
that bare conditionals contain a covert necessity modal operator (Kratzer,
2012, pp. 97-8), it had yet to acknowledge the implication that the theory
invalidates arguments we might take to be valid and validates arguments we
might take to be invalid.
Looking forward, we might turn toward the theories I don’t consider
here on the grounds that they lie beyond the scope of the thesis: dynamic or
expressivist approaches to conditionals (Cantwell, 2008, Yalcin, 2012 and
Bledin, 2015).

149

REFERENCES

Adams, E. (1970). Subjunctive and indicative conditionals. Foundations of
Language, 6(1), 89-94.
Adams, E. (1975). The logic of conditionals. Dortrecht: Reidel.
Bennett, J. (2003) A philosophical guide to conditionals. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Blackburn, S. (1986). How can we tell whether a commitment has a truth
condition?, in C. Travis (Ed.), Meaning and interpretation (pp. 20132). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bledin, J. (2015). Modus ponens defended. The Journal of Philosophy, 112(2),
57-83.
Burks, A. & and Copi, I. (1950). Lewis Carroll’s barber shop paradox. Mind,
59(234), 219-22.
Cantwell, J. (2008). Changing the modal context. Theoria, 74(4), 331-51.
Carroll, L. (1894). A logical paradox. Mind, 3(11), 436-38.
Edgington, D. (1995). On conditionals. Mind, 104(414), 235-329.
Edgington, D. (2014). Indicative conditionals. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conditionals/
Florensky, P. (1997) The pillar and ground of truth. (B. Joakim, Trans.).
Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Original work published in
1914)
Forrester, J. (1984). Gentle murder, or the adverbial samaritan. The Journal of
Philosophy, 81(4), 193-7.

150

Fulda, J. S. (2010). Vann McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens: An
enthymeme.’ Journal of Pragmatics, 42(1), 271-3.
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35, 121-52.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.),
Speech acts (Vol. 3) (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
Hájek, A. (2012) The fall of ‘Adams’ Thesis’? The Journal of Logic,
Language and Information, 21, 145-61.
Jackson, F. (1979). On assertion and indicative conditionals. The
Philosophical Review, 88(4), 565-89.
Jackson, F. (1987). Conditionals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Jackson, F. (2006). Conditionals. In M. Devitt & R. Hanley (Eds.), The
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language (pp. 212-24). Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell.
Johnson, W. E. (1894). A logical paradox. Mind, 3(12), 583.
Katz, B. D. (1999). On a supposed counterexample to modus ponens. The
Journal of Philosophy, 96(8), 404-15.
Khoo, J. (2013). A note on Gibbard’s proof.’ Philosophical Studies, 166, supp.
1, 153-64.
Khoo, J. (2015). On indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Philosophers’
Imprint, 15(32), 1-40.
Kolodny, N. & MacFarlane, J. (2010). ‘Ifs and oughts.’ The Journal of
Philosophy, 107(3), 115-43.

151

Kratzer, A. (2012) Modals and Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1976). Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.
The Philosophical Review, 85(3), 297-315.
Lewis, D. (1998). Papers in philosophical logic. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (1987). Not a counterexample to modus ponens. Analysis, 47(1),
44-7.
McGee, V. (1985). A counterexample to modus ponens. The Journal of
Philosophy, 82(9), 462-71.
McGee, V. (1989). Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionals.
Philosophical Review, 98(4), 485-541.
Piller, C. (1996). Vann McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens.
Philosophical Studies, 82(1), 27-54.
Potts, C. (2004) The logic of conventional implicatures. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1952). Methods of Logic. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
Rhodes, M. (2012). Note on Florensky’s solution to Carroll’s “barbershop”
paradox: Reverse implication for Russell?’. Philosophia, 40(3), 60716.
Russell, B. (1905). The existential import of propositions. Mind, 14(55), 398402.
Sidgwick, A. (1894). A logical paradox. Mind, 3(12), 582.

152

Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Moor, J. & Fogelin, R. (1986). A defense of modus
ponens. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 296-300.
Stalnaker, R. (1981). A theory of conditionals. In W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker
& G. Pearce (Eds.), Ifs: Conditionals, belief, decision, change, and
time (pp. 41-55). Dortrecht: Reidel.
Stalnaker, R. (1999). Context and content: Essays on intentionality in speech
and thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Veltman, F. (1985). Logics for conditionals (Doctoral dissertation). University
of Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
Von Fintel, K., & Heim, I. (2011). Intensional semantics [PDF document].
24.973 Advanced Semantics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Spring. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/fintel/fintel-heimintensional.pdf
Wedgwood, R. (2016) Objective and subjective ‘ought’. In N. Charlow and
M. Chrisman (Eds.), Deontic modality. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Yalcin, S. (2010) Probability operators. Philosophy Compass, 5(11), 916-37.
Yalcin, S. (2012). A counterexample to modus tollens. The Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 41(6), 1001-24.

153

